THE RIGHTS OF FARBER'S SOURCES **ARYEH NEIER**

THE NATION

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NICARAGUA'S CIVIL WAR Penny Lernoux

HOPES THAT WENT GLIMMERING
New Light on the A-Bomb Race
Barton J. Bernstein

CARTER'S URBAN POLICY
David C. Perry / Alfred J. Watkins

EASY MONEY FOR REPRESSION
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LETTERS

shaking up the party

New York City

Carey McWilliams concludes his excellent roundup of the current political situation [editorial, "The Cannibals," *The Nation*, July 1] by noting the lack of interest in the Democratic Party midterm conference in Memphis this coming December and Carter's attempt to turn it into a tame affair.

Some of us are trying to shake up the Democrats. We organized the Democratic Agenda last year, with support from trade unionists, minority activists, feminists, environmentalists—reformers of every kind. We held a successful three-day conference in Washington, attended by 1,200 activists mainly from the Northeast. We have followed up with activities in Texas, North Carolina, California, Illinois, New York, Detroit, Philadelphia, Long Island; other plans are in the works.

In terms of McWilliams's article we have been encouraging Democratic reformers around the country to run for delegate to the midterm conference. We are now working with the broad cross section of party leadership that the Democratic Agenda represents to insure that the Memphis conference is a genuine opportunity for party activists to have a voice—and vote—in setting party policies and positions on the critical issues facing this country today.

Readers of *The Nation* who are already involved in this process or who would like to be can get in touch with us c/o The Democratic Agenda, 853 Broadway, Room 617, New York, N.Y. 10003.

Michael Harrington

origins of Proposition 13

El Cerrito, Calif.

The Libertarian Party philosophy was behind Proposition 13, and it is the party which benefited most from its passage. The Libertarians say the less government the better. Government should only take care of national defense, local police and fire protection. Schools should be private, there should be no welfare, and social cooperation for recreation, health care and environmental protection is out. Competition would reign supreme; the rewards would go to those who can make it, while the poor would shift for themselves.

This philosophy, perhaps applicable to a country with a wide-open frontier, such as the USA of 1776, hardly seems workable in an overpopulated, resource-short society, where interdependence is inevitable. It is the opposite of the New Deal.

Proposition 13 goes a long way toward these objectives, and only a large state surplus has saved California this year. Next year, very likely, the public school system will be decimated, and welfare severely chopped. The alternative, higher sales or income taxes, the Libertarians are now striving to prevent with another proposition.

How can any "liberal" be for a dog-eat-dog idea, with social costs shifted more and more to the poor?

Bruce O. Watkins

anyone for the old CCC?

New York City

Many of us wondered what happened to the 3 million men who served in the Civilian Conservation Corps from 1933 to 1942. So, in the summer of 1977 about 500 former CCC members from thirty-nine states met in Sacramento, Calif. and organized the National Association of Civilian Conservation Corps Alumni (NACCA). Anyone who served in the CCC in any capacity is eligible to join NACCA. For details, please contact Jack Vincent, 1709 Michigan, West Sacramento, Calif. 95691.

I served in Mrs. Roosevelt's Women's Land Army. We like to hear from them too.

Magi Maxwell

Variations CALVIN TRILLIN

I married Alice under the assumption that she could spell "occurred." She now insists that nothing specific was mentioned about "occurred" in prenuptial discussions. It seems to me, though, that implicit in someone's making a living as a college English teacher is the representation that she is a speller with a repertoire adequate to any occasion. She must have known that the only person in her line of work I had any experience being related to, my Cousin Keith from Salina, once reached the finals of the Kansas state spelling bee. She now says Cousin Keith's spelling triumph was never spoken of between us. I distinctly remember, though, that I listed for Alice the highlights of our family's history, as any prospective bridegroom might for his future wife, and Cousin Keith has always been part of my standard Family History recitation—along with my Cousin Neil, who was once the head drum major of the University of Nebraska marching band, and my Uncle Benny Daynofsky, who in his early 80s was knocked down by a car while planting tomatoes in his own backyard in St. Jo. It is significant that she does not deny knowing about Uncle Benny.

Is spelling the sort of thing that modern young couples get straightened out beforehand in marriage contracts? I wouldn't bring it up after all of these years, except that, as it happens, I can't spell "occurred" either. I was forced to look it up twice in order to write the first paragraph, and once more to get this far in the second. Somehow, I had expected to marry someone whose spelling would be, if not perfect, at least complementary to mine. We would face the future with heads held high, and maybe a short song on our lips—confident that together we could spell anything they dished out. Before we had been married a month, the real world started to eat away at that fantasy: It turned out that Alice was not very good on "commitment." I don't mean she didn't have any; she couldn't spell it. I have never been able to spell "commitment" myself.

I know how to spell "embarrass"—usually considered by double-letter specialists to be a much more difficult word. I have been able to spell it for years. I planted "embarrass" in my mind at an early age through a rather brilliant mnemonic device having to do with barstools. In fact, not to make a lot out of it, I had always thought of my ability to spell "embarrass" as a nice little facility to bring to a marriage—the sort of minor bonus that is sometimes found in a husband's ability to rewire lamps. (I don't mean it was the only facility I was able to contribute: Although I can't rewire a lamp, I can bark like a dog and I can blow a hard-boiled egg out of its shell seven times out of ten.) We have now been married thirteen years, and Alice still has not asked me how to spell "embarrass." Apparently, she has a mnemonic device of her own. I have never inquired. That sort of thing doesn't interest me.

For a while, our reformist friends used to urge us to make a list of the words that troubled both of us—their theory being that some wretched consistency in the

(*Continued on page 230*)

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EDITORIALS

Three Men on a Mountain

It is given out by all three sides of the Israeli-Arab-U.S. triangle that the Camp David meetings will be completely unstructured, without even an agenda to get them started. To make this particular "summit" sound even more like a college bull session, we are told that success or failure will depend on "personal interaction," or so a nameless White House source told *The Washington Post* (September 5). The personal chemistry of the three at Camp David, reacting one with another, is not the best formula for peace in the Mideast.

Peace itself, or even a hesitant step toward it, will be determined by the "interaction" of the objective forces in play over this issue and by the politics of all three countries. One can only hope that Carter will banish from his mind the "psychological profiles" of Begin and Sadat which the CIA drew up for him and instead bear down on the actual complexities of the situation of Israel, its Arab neighbors and the onlooking world.

There are one or two obvious factors which one can hope that Carter has in the right order when he sits down to conduct, or lead, this open-ended discussion. The first is that the question of peace in the Middle East is much more a regional than a global problem. If it is looked at as a chip, however important, in the United States' deadly strategic game with the Soviet Union, the chip will lose its power to affect either Israel or Egypt. Kissinger's failures to take advantage of the opportunities offered to him in this area, as he focused on the big global issues, is reminder enough for Carter as he faces his delicate task.

The second point is expressed in the debate over whether Carter's role will be that of "broker" or "full partner" in these discussions. He will be both, of course, but, to the extent that it is possible, he should be more broker than partner. This country does have major interests in peace in the Middle East, starting with the firm moral commitment to the safety and survival of Israel. But if we did not also have legitimate concern for the fate of the Palestinians and an interest in the decent development of the Arab world, we would have no standing that might help in the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This formulation leaves out such factors as petroleum supplies and strategic influence—and it is meant to, for, although these great practical questions will be on everyone's mind at Camp David, they cannot be the dominant ones or nothing will be accomplished.

The center of the discussion will be about the security of Israel after the satisfaction of those Arab demands that can be met without impairing that paramount requirement. To state that objective is not, of course, to say how it will be accomplished, at Camp David or anywhere else. That depends more on the good will than on the cleverness of all three participants, and one can only hope or pray that the will for peace will dominate.

Americans may be forgiven for adding a hope of their own—that President Carter will take a chance with his own political future and dare to risk failure at Camp

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David. That means, in our view, that he must be prepared for the meeting to break up without any progress toward agreement between Sadat and Begin. An attempt, for domestic political reasons, to produce the illusion of agreement where none exists, would be the worst thing that could happen on that mountaintop.

SEEDS OF PEACE

Our editorial on the meeting at Camp David views with "cautious pessimism" the dangers inherent in that "summit." It is encouraging in this context that Milton Viorst, our correspondent in Israel, has sent from Jerusalem a dispatch that—by revealing the flexibility, inherent if not always apparent, in the Israeli position—is cautiously optimistic. Mr. Viorst refers to the Peace Now movement, and readers will be interested to know that he is writing for early publication in these pages an extensive discussion of this development on Israel's political scene. —The Editors

The peace plan that Menachem Begin has taken with him to Camp David is nothing new, but while few Israelis expect a dramatic breakthrough, a new mood of cautious optimism is to be sensed in Jerusalem. Contrary to most reporting on the matter, pro-peace forces here are finding Begin's much-abused peace plan increasingly attractive as they examine its implications more closely.

Months ago Begin proposed autonomous local administrations for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the question of sovereignty to be deferred for five years. Though this is the same "home rule" plan that received so much criticism earlier in the year, some Israeli observers now perceive in it a certain promise, perhaps even beyond what Begin intended.

After a year and a half in office, Begin is no longer seen as an ideologue whose zealotry is likely to bring Israel down. Many may suspect that at heart he is still a right-wing fanatic, but as Prime Minister he has been conducting himself quite differently.

One need only point to the startling contradiction between talk and action on that most contentious of matters, the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. Rhetorically, Begin has not budged from his insistence that the West Bank is inherently part of Israel, but the truth is that, after eighteen months in office, the government has not authorized a single new settlement* and the Jewish population of the West Bank is not really greater than it was during the Labor regime.

West Bank settlers today complain that Begin has done nothing for them; they feel themselves betrayed. Labor Party stalwarts, on the other hand, accept the settlers as a commitment, and will not contemplate a peace agreement that disturbs them. Begin has never taken a position nearly that rigid.

His apparent flexibility—or at least his decided vagueness—on the settlements issue suggests to some here that he could be equally flexible on the disputed sovereignty over the West Bank. It is argued by some in Peace Now circles that Begin's "home rule" plans for the West Bank and Gaza contain within them the germs of virtually everything that Sadat wants.

They assume that the West Bank-Gaza Palestinians, having organized local administrations, would over five years create strong political institutions which the Israelis would be hard pressed to abolish. If these institutions were competently run, one can foresee that after five years such a local Arab administration could be a suitable framework for the transferral of actual sovereignty to the Palestinians. In other words, Begin may be carrying with him to Camp David the seeds of an event that Israel says will never happen—the actual creation of a Palestinian state.

If any Israeli politician could—with the aid of a little political subterfuge—bring off a peace agreement along such lines, it is Menachem Begin. He has never been politically stronger. If an election were held tomorrow, he would win more seats in the Knesset than he has today. He is still seen as an honest, straightforward and public-spirited politician in sharp contrast to the Labor Party leadership he replaced. The problem facing President Carter at Camp David is that both Begin and Sadat are attached to the symbols of sovereignty. It will indeed take an ingenious formulation to reconcile two symbols so directly in conflict.

MILTON VIORST

* Our attempts to check out the precise number of authorized settlements by phone calls to Israeli, State Department and other sources have been frustrated by the semantic ambiguity surrounding the selection, authorization and actual occupation of sites on the West Bank. Although some twenty settlements have been occupied during Begin's tenure, he has left open a degree of flexibility on the issue. —*The Editors*

THE RIGHTS OF FARBER'S SOURCES

ARYEH NEIER

Now that Myron Farber has been released from jail and will get a hearing, it seems a good time to re-examine the vexed question of the newsman's privilege.

It may clarify the problem if we start thinking about it as the source's privilege. Just as the penitent enjoys the privilege of communicating in confidence with a priest, the client with a lawyer and the patient with a doctor, so a source should be able to give information in confidence to a journalist.

The source's privilege is different from any other in one crucial respect: we know the identities of patient, client or penitent, but do not know what they said. In the case of the source, we know what he said; only his identity is held in confidence.

Aryeh Neier is the executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union. His views here do not necessarily reflect the position of the ACLU.

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Six years ago the United States Supreme Court considered several cases where a newsman's privilege had been asserted to resist grand jury subpoenas. A majority of the Court told the journalists they had to comply with the subpoenas because they were "no intrusions upon speech or assembly, no prior restraint or restriction on what the press may publish, and no express or implied command that the press publish what it prefers to withhold." In short, there seemed to be at stake nothing that deserved the protection of the First Amendment.

Perhaps it would have been better if the cases had been recast as assertions of privilege for sources. The Supreme Court has a long tradition of acknowledging that the right to speak anonymously is protected by the First Amendment. In 1958, for example, the Court rejected Alabama's effort to obtain a copy of the membership list of the state NAACP on the ground that the "Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association." Two years later, the Supreme Court invalidated a Los Angeles ordinance that prohibited the distribution of handbills unless they identified the printer and author.

The right to speak and associate anonymously goes to the very heart of the values protected by the First Amendment. If the government knows the identity of a dissident, it can punish him. But if a dissident can associate with others of like mind or disseminate ideas and information without revealing his identity, he may be emboldened to speak. The First Amendment is intended to encourage everyone to speak without fear of reprisal by the government.

John Lilburne and John Milton, those redoubtable champions of freedom of speech in 17th-century England, fought for the right to speak anonymously. Lilburne was whipped and pilloried for his refusal to divulge to the Star Chamber the publishers and distributors of pamphlets critical of Charles I. Milton's classic essay, the *Areopagitica*, was written to protest an order of Parliament that required the licensing of any publisher or seller of books and thus make anonymity impossible. In the American Colonies, several of the Founding Fathers sought anonymity, and thereby freedom from government reprisal, by signing their essays about freedom with Latin names. The practice was so well established that it persisted after the Revolution had succeeded. *The Federalist* papers were published under the collective pseudonym of Publius.

The right to speak anonymously remains central to contemporary attempts to secure compliance with the First Amendment. One reason we complain about political surveillance is that the government violates our right of anonymity as it gathers information about the views and associations of dissenters. We assert a right to belong to any organization, contribute to any cause, speak on any subject or participate in any demonstration without the government discovering our identities.

The constitutional bias in favor of anonymity has a single exception, however, and it is directly at issue in the Farber case. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that a defendant in a criminal trial shall have the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." This does not contradict the protection ordinarily given to anonymity. It stems from the same interest in protecting the citizen against the power of government. The government wants to send Dr. Mario Jascalevich to prison for a good many years. He asserts that the government's prosecution of him was based on Myron Farber's articles and those articles, in turn, were based on accusations from witnesses who have sought anonymity by extracting a pledge of confidentiality from Farber.

Myron Farber's sources seem to want to maintain their anonymity; at least, they have not disclosed their identities. We can only speculate about what reprisals they fear if they make themselves known. On the other side, however, we don't have to speculate about Dr. Jascalevich's fears. He is being tried on charges of multiple murder and, if he does not clear himself, the reprisal will be the criminal sentence that is imposed on him by the state of New Jersey.

A source's right to anonymity is so important that it must not be breached every time a defendant in a criminal case claims that his prosecution was triggered by a news story. Because a defendant's Sixth Amendment right conflicts with what would be a source's First Amendment right in any other circumstances, we should require a defendant to demonstrate to a court that it is essential to his defense to learn the identity of a source. Myron Farber was jailed before any such burden was imposed on Dr. Jascalevich. But if and when Jascalevich meets that burden, Farber should be required to disclose his sources. They enjoy a right to anonymity as against the government, but not against a person placed on trial on criminal charges as a result of their accusations.

As long as a source is accusing a private individual brought to trial on criminal charges, I see no direct clash between the values embodied in the First Amendment and those at stake in the Sixth Amendment. The situation would be very different, however, if a newsman's source sought anonymity for charges that resulted in a criminal prosecution of a government official. Here, the conflict would be head-on. A government official, like anyone else tried on criminal charges, has a right to confront the witnesses against him. Yet in such circumstances, a source's First Amendment right to anonymity is especially important because the fear of government reprisals is greatest.

It may be that the only resolution possible in cases of such direct conflict between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights will be to dismiss prosecutions against government officials if they demonstrate that learning the identity of a newsman's source is essential and the source refuses to release a newsman from a pledge of anonymity. The prospect of freeing government officials on such grounds is not pleasant. We want to see the likes of Richard Nixon, John Mitchell and John Ehrlichman pay the same penalties as anyone else. But it is even more important to know when they are engaged in wrongdoing so that we can make them pay political penalties. Perhaps we must content ourselves with degrading them and throwing them out of office if we are to offer a guarantee of anonymity to sources that will permit them to tell the press about the government's crimes. □

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American educational system would be further documented by the fact that a husband and wife who went to public schools 1,300 miles apart were left without the ability to spell precisely the same words. Not long ago, an analytically inclined Easterner who came over for a drink when Alice happened to be out of town tried to establish some psychological significance in which words Alice and I were able to spell and which ones we weren't. "Is it really an accident that neither of you can spell 'commitment' but both of you can spell 'embarrass?' " he said. It has been my experience that when analytically inclined Easterners ask a question that begins "Is it really an accident . . ." the answer is always yes. I wanted to write Alice to describe the psychological analysis of our spelling problem, but, as it happens, the one word she can spell and I can't is "cockamamie."

Converts to the new politics of lowered expectations have told me that I should simply accept Alice's spelling limitations and comfort myself with thoughts of the many splendid qualities she does have—the way Americans are now supposed to settle for only two gigantic automobiles, reminding themselves that some people in Chad have none at all. I have tried that. I have reminded myself that Alice can explain foreign movies and decipher road maps. I suspect that in a pinch she might be able to rewire a lamp. But, having come of drinking age in the 1950s, I may be culturally immune to the politics of lowered expectations. I can't get over the suspicion that a politician who preaches that doctrine is really arguing that we ought to settle for him. I still find myself thinking back on the old-fashioned scenes I had envisioned for our marriage: We are sitting peacefully in the parlor—after having kissed the little ones goodnight—and I glance up from the desk, where I have been polishing off a letter to the *Times* on our policy in the Far East, and say, "Alice, how do you spell 'referred?' " Alice tells me. Or, on another evening, Alice looks over from her side of the desk (in this version of our marriage, the custodian of an abandoned courthouse in Pennsylvania had sold us an 18th-century double-desk for $85, including delivery to New York in his brother's pickup), where she has been composing a letter to her parents saying how sublimely happy she is. She asks me how to spell "embarrass." I tell her. □

SHOWDOWN WITH THE SOMOZAS

NICARAGUA'S CIVIL WAR

PENNY LERNOUX

"I'll give this country peace if I have to kill every other man in Nicaragua," vowed Anastasio Somoza, founder of the forty-two-year-old dynasty. His son may have to do just that, for Nicaragua is in the throes of a civil war, the government near collapse.

All but two of the Somoza family's allies have deserted the "clan," leaving the regime dependent on an ambivalent Carter administration and the increasingly uncertain loyalty of the army and police, who supply the personnel of the National Guard. Such traditional pillars of support as the Catholic Church and the business community have joined the opposition, presenting the extraordinary spectacle of capitalists and bishops in common cause with Marxist guerrillas. Landowners, professionals, bankers and even members of Somoza's own liberal party have likewise fled the sinking ship. All the country's major cities are in revolt, with daily confrontations between the National Guard and civilians. In the past two months the guerrillas have assaulted military posts, launched a missile attack from Managua's Intercontinental Hotel on army headquarters and Somoza's own "bunker," and pulled off the spectacular occupation of the National Palace, holding hundreds, including the entire Congress, hostage. The economy is in shambles because of constant strikes by the business community and the flight of more than $43 million from local banks. At least 800 people have died or been wounded and 500 arrested since the beginning of the year.

Yet the 53-year-old dictator hangs on in a fight to the death, thanks to U.S. arms and his private army of 7,500 Guardsmen. "People will just have to get used to living with a certain level of violence," Somoza said. If he survives, it will be at the cost of the lives of the youth of the nation, who have gone into the streets of the cities armed only with sticks and stones to battle the machine guns and bombs. In the city of Matagalpa, north of Managua, some 500 youths aged 14 to 17 battled last month with 1,000 crack Guardsmen commanded by Somoza's son, Anastasio the Third. At least fifty people died and 200 were wounded during an aerial bombardment of the city.

The shocking thing about this carnage is that Washington implicitly condones it, with the not unexpected result that the desperate Nicaraguans are being driven into the arms of the guerrillas. Said Nicaragua's well-known religious poet Ernesto Cardenal, who joined the guerrillas last October: "Fortunately for us, the United States has never learned the lesson that in supporting cruel and

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corrupt dictatorships, it only radicalizes the population, causing the very thing it does not want: socialist governments."

The first and fatal mistake was made long ago, in the 1920s, when U.S. Marines attempted to put down a peasant uprising led by Augusto Sandino, a popular leader and the namesake of the current guerrilla front. The Pentagon created, trained and armed the National Guard, and to this day nearly all National Guard officers spend their last year of training in the Panama Canal Zone. Anastasio Somoza the First was named to head the army-police force. He used this position to seize the Presidency in 1936, having murdered Sandino two years before. After promising an amnesty and dialogue, he then promptly killed everyone who had taken him at his word.

Despite the massacre of some 25,000 Nicaraguans during the Somozas' long reign, Washington continued to prop up the dictatorship with military and economic aid. During the 1960s and 1970s the Somoza family regularly cried wolf at Congressional aid hearings, falsely claiming that money was needed to fight a Castro-financed guerrilla invasion. Although there were periodic flare-ups, just as there had been in the 1930s, '40s and '50s, guerrilla forces never posed a serious threat to the government, and even as late as 1976 the Sandinista guerrillas numbered no more than fifty militants. The money, the training and the arms received from the United States were used for something quite different: to repress the people through torture, imprisonment and murder.

But there comes a time, even for the most efficient dictatorships, when the people rebel. In Nicaragua the rebellion started on January 10 when Somoza assassins murdered Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, a popular Managua newspaper publisher and the only opposition leader with a broad-based following. With Chamorro's death, the wolf finally did appear, and the phantom threat of a guerrilla uprising supported by peasants, workers, students and businessmen became real. But Fidel Castro had no hand in the guerrillas' success; it was entirely the doing of the Somozas—and the United States.

The Carter administration has had a chance to remedy this error but, succumbing to pressure from Somoza supporters in Congress and the State Department, the President failed to take the initiative. Thanks to the well-financed Nicaragua lobby headed by Rep. Charles Wilson (D., Texas) and to Terence Todman, the then Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Congress reversed an earlier vote, restoring $3.1 million in U.S. military aid to the Somoza government. In May the same lobby used its leverage to unfreeze $12.5 million in U.S. loans for nonmilitary programs and a $32 million soft loan from the Inter-American Development Bank to construct a road in northern Nicaragua connecting two military garrisons. Some 600 peasants have been killed by the National Guard in this area since 1975, according to sources in the Catholic Church.

Meanwhile, Carter wrote a letter to Somoza praising him for the improvement in human rights, apparently on the advice of the faction in the State Department which believes that the only immediate alternative to Somoza is anarchy and/or a Marxist government. The ingenuous theory behind this argument is that a more democratic government will emerge in the 1981 elections when Somoza has promised to step down, thereby eliminating the threat of guerrillas and socialism and the embarrassing liability of the Somoza family. The problem with this happy ending is that the Nicaraguan people are not willing to wait. And if history repeats, the Somozas will never step down (among the family's current Presidential aspirants are Somoza's brother José and his son Anastasio, both top officials in the National Guard).

Contrary to State Department claims, the "leadership vacuum" caused by Chamorro's murder has been filled by a broad coalition, ranging from the business community to the Sandinista guerrillas. These various interest groups have been brought together by businessmen, academics and church leaders known as "The Twelve," who have sons and brothers in both the guerrillas and the business community. Obviously, there are enormous differences between the opposition groups, the guerrillas wanting instant socialism and the abolition of private enterprise, the industrialists and large landowners insisting on business as usual, but without Somoza. Yet there are also Nicaraguans in both camps who believe these differences can be resolved, without nationalizing the private sector, by expropriating the Somoza family's enormous landholdings of 5 million acres and its industrial interests, including the twenty-six biggest companies in the country. These resources could be used to finance sweeping reforms, such as the redistribution of land to peasants. The coalition wants a democratic government representing all anti-Somoza forces, including the guerrillas, and a complete reorganization of the National Guard to serve the people, not the Somozas.

Instead of supporting this initiative, the misled Carter administration continues to side with Somoza in the belief that such a coalition will not work. Maybe it won't but the alternatives are even more daunting. If Somoza does not leave Nicaragua peacefully, with a firm push from the United States, the struggle will be decided by military force, and the only such forces in Nicaragua are the National Guard and the guerrillas. Morale in the National Guard is low, because of the heavy beating the military has taken from the guerrillas and Somoza's recent dismissal of thirty of its thirty-five army and police chiefs. Earlier, a plot to overthrow Somoza was discovered; it involved 200 National Guardsmen and was the first such mutiny in two decades. The guerrillas, on the other hand, grow bolder by the day.

As poet Cardenal points out, the future of Nicaragua depends on "who kicks Somoza out." If it is the guerrillas, says Cardenal, the situation will be very different from what it might have been had the United States repudiated him.

Anyone studying the history of repression and corruption in Nicaragua will see obvious parallels with Batista's Cuba. The wonder is that no one in Washington has made the connection. □

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EASY MONEY FOR REPRESSION

BEHIND THE SCENES AT THE IMF

JIM MORRELL

A major controversy is quietly brewing inside the Washington headquarters of the International Monetary Fund over its lending policies to Third World nations of varying political stripes. Confidential minutes of the IMF's executive directors' meetings obtained by The Nation *demonstrate that on a number of occasions IMF directors themselves objected to the use of an apparent double standard in the administration of loans to such countries as Argentina and South Africa. In the case of both nations loans were extended while departing from the IMF's usually strict set of belt-tightening measures, a decision vociferously defended by the American representatives. The debate narrated below by Jim Morrell raises serious questions about the political impact of U.S. foreign aid funneled through multilateral institutions like the IMF.*

At 10 A.M. on September 16, 1977 the twenty executive directors of the International Monetary Fund, representing the treasury departments and finance ministries of the fund's 134 contributing nations, filed into the large conference room on the top floor of the IMF's luxurious Washington headquarters building. As the last one entered the room the guard firmly shut the door behind him; like all executive board meetings this was to be a strictly closed-door affair. No public would be admitted; no minutes would be published. In the absence of Johannes Witteveen, the American acting managing director William Dale ran the meeting. Argentina and its request for a $194-million standby loan from the IMF was the chief item on the agenda, the executive directors realized as they sifted through the stack of documents provided for each of them by the IMF staff.

Much would depend on the outcome of the meeting. For in addition to being one of the most secretive organizations in the world, the IMF is also one of the most powerful. Its power only partly derives from the $30 billion (shortly to rise to $40 billion) that the rich member nations have chipped in for its balance-of-payments fund, to be re-lent to financially strapped members. Much more of its power derives from its function as an international credit agency which confers its seal of good housekeeping on the financial policies of member nations, thereby clearing the way for private bank loans and other aid many times larger than the amount the fund has to lend. To Citibank, Chase Manhattan and the other big multinational banks looking for comparatively safe places to unload their surplus petrodollars, the IMF imprimatur gives the comfortable feeling of an implied government guarantee; and nobody loves a government guarantee more than the free-trade and free-enterprise advocates of Wall Street. Thus while the IMF prepared to debate its $194-million loan to Argentina, bankers with more than $1 billion to lend nervously awaited the outcome.

The meeting began. The executive directors patiently listened to the Argentine representative's pitch for aid and routinely scanned the text of the proposed standby agreement. Then, with growing incredulity, they realized that the staff had omitted one of the invariable conditions for an IMF standby loan to any country—a ceiling on inflation. Normally, the IMF requires a borrowing country to agree to strict "performance criteria" or "targets" as a condition for receiving a balance-of-payments loan. The targets include reductions in balance-of-payments deficits, in government expenditures, in credit expansion (inflation), and in real wages—all designed to stabilize a country's finances and divert more of its scarce hard-currency export earnings to servicing the foreign debt. But in Argentina's case, the loan agreement inexplicably lacked any target for inflation reduction beyond three months—a significant omission, since Argentina was suffering from the worst inflation in the world. Approval would mean setting a double standard. As eyebrows were raised around the room, a heated discussion began.

The omission represented a "departure from present policies and practices with respect to one-year standby arrangements," charged Lamberto Dini, the executive director for Italy, Spain, Portugal and Malta. Next, Denis Samuel-Lajeunesse of France expressed "surprise" at the omission of targets, while H.O. Ruding of the Netherlands wondered out loud "whether there were convincing political, legal or economic reasons why targets had not been provided." William Ryrie of Great Britain and Gerhard Laske of West Germany also wondered why the usual targets and performance criteria had been omitted by the staff negotiators. Frede Hollensen, representing the Scandinavian countries, formally proposed an amendment to the draft decision prohibiting Argentina from receiving any money until targets were set and observed. Executive director Dini again scolded the IMF staff for departing from standard practice. "Any such departure," he insisted, "should be the result of a deliberate executive board decision and should not be proposed on a piecemeal basis by the staff in accordance with its judgment of the particular circumstances in a particular country."

By the end of the discussion, six directors representing all the major countries of Western Europe had opposed the waiver of targets for Argentina. But the IMF is a pre-eminently American, not West European institution —founded at American insistence at the Bretton Woods monetary conference of 1944 in order to promote an open world economy, headquartered in Washington where the Treasury Department can keep a close eye on it, and structured so as to assure an American veto in any

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major policy matters. The American executive director, Sam Cross, had no trouble with the staff's special treatment of Argentina and described himself as "pleased both with the significant and continuing progress" Argentina had achieved in its economy "and with the timely and active support that the fund had provided." He contended that "the low level of reserves and the substantial economic problems that remained constituted an adequate justification for the requested standby arrangement" of $194 million, of which the United States' share was to be $46 million through its contribution to the fund.

And as usual it was this American view that prevailed, as the staff rejected the charges of the West Europeans and pleaded the vagaries of the Argentine harvest and the difficulties of predicting Argentina's runaway inflation, but without explaining why other loan applicants, presumably with their own economic imponderables, nevertheless were bound to set and observe precise targets. Acting managing director Dale said that targets would be negotiated between Argentina and the staff when the funds were drawn, thus widening the discre-

Vadillo, El Sol de Mexico

Underdeveloped Nations

tionary power of the staff even further. Sharp criticism of the type aired at the Argentina meeting is extremely rare at IMF executive board meetings and can only be provoked by a serious departure from the rules; and even in this case, the staff's views prevailed. The staff is internationally recruited, but takes the American position on most matters.

In the event, Argentina never did draw down the $194 million in standby funds because of improvements in its current accounts position, but the money remained available as a checkbook balance to the Argentine Government should need arise. More important, the fund's imprimatur gave Argentina the chance over the next six months to raise $1.1 billion in private bank loans on Wall Street and in the Eurocurrency and international bond market.

The fund's action on Argentina was only one of several recent unpublicized occasions on which not outside critics but the fund's own executive directors have rebuked the IMF staff for improperly favoring or penalizing a particular country. On each of the occasions it was various non-U.S. executive directors who criticized, and the U.S. executive director who endorsed the procedures of the staff. Argentina and South Africa are two of the countries that gained by these procedures, according to the objecting executive directors; Jamaica and Peru are two that lost. The former two are among the worst human rights violating regimes in the world today, while the latter two are at least attempting to follow democratic or Populist courses acceptable to a broad majority. Already, even without the discretionary power of the staff, the IMF's general rules of conditionality for loans are structured to favor undemocratic regimes willing to impose painful austerity programs on the poor majority, usually by violence; but what the various non-U.S. executive directors were contending is that the IMF staff exceeded even these rules and standard practices to favor or penalize particular countries.

The most sensational such allegation came during a November 1976 meeting on South Africa, and again it was Italian executive director Dini who led the criticism. At this meeting South Africa received $186 million, part of a total IMF package of $464 million, with the strong support of the United States and Great Britain but over various objections voiced by executive directors representing twenty-two European and African nations. Specifically, executive director Dini accused the IMF staff of rigging the fund's own statistical formulas to favor South Africa's case for aid. The West German executive director Eckard Pieske echoed Dini's complaint, flatly charging that the statistics prepared by the staff to justify South Africa's request had been "tailored to the size of the requested drawing." (They were supposed to reflect objective trade data.) At an earlier January 1976 meeting called to consider South Africa's first loan request, the Belgian executive director Jacques de Groote complained that South Africa, with one of the world's largest gold stocks to back up its currency reserves, might not really need the fund's assistance at all; while Antoine W. Yameogo, the executive director representing seventeen West African nations, said South Africa could raise the money it needed by using its gold as collateral. Despite these objections, South Africa received an aid package larger than the rest of black Africa put together.

Peru and Jamaica, however, each with a recent tradition of leftist or Populist policies, have fared much worse

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at the hands of the IMF. The performance targets and statistical forecasts, so easily waived or "adjusted" for Argentina and South Africa, are applied to these two wayward countries with full rigor. Again, some of the executive directors complained. This time the lineup among them was different. In the Argentine and South African cases, West European directors concerned to maintain the integrity of IMF decision-making clashed with the U.S. Treasury Department impulse to reward countries that were cooperating financially with the United States (especially since more public ways of reward were made difficult by official U.S. policy against South Africa's apartheid and Argentina's human rights violations). In the cases of Jamaica and Peru, the protesting executive directors were all Third World representatives, reflecting the basic North-South division in the fund, while the United States lined up with the other industrialized countries in imposing severe conditions for the fund's aid.

In a November 5, 1976 executive board meeting on Jamaica, the major industrial country representatives vied with one another in scolding President Michael Manley's government for slapping on unauthorized import licensing restrictions and otherwise breaking their promises to the fund; in vain did the Jamaicans protest that further unemployment and social unrest provoked by an IMF austerity program would have only scared more tourists away, exacerbating the dollar shortage even further. Third World representatives at the meeting sympathized with the Jamaican Government's dilemma. "The social and political conditions were such that they could not be ignored," maintained Festus G. Mogae, representing sixteen African nations. This plea for understanding left U.S. director Cross unmoved. "The Jamaican authorities had departed substantially from the financial program that had been presented to the fund," he said reprovingly. (The program would have required cuts in wages and government aid for the poor.) "The concept of conditionality for the use of the fund's compensatory financing facility and its other facilities must not be weakened," he insisted, although five days later he was to overlook completely the staff's rigging of statistics to favor South Africa's request. In the Jamaican case, only a Canadian pledge of $98.6 million in bilateral balance-of-payments aid to the hard-pressed Manley government sweetened the pot enough for the rest of the industrial country representatives to agree to a $15.5 million compensatory financing loan. The running battle between Jamaica and the IMF continued through 1977 into 1978 until Jamaica finally conceded to most of the fund's demands.

Peru also has been at constant odds with the IMF in recent years, and to obtain $109 million in a standby arrangement from the fund in November 1977 it had to agree to tight performance criteria extending over two years: a reduction of the rate of inflation to 20 percent in 1978 and a further reduction in 1979. Peru undertook to increase general tax revenues in 1978 by 1.5 percent of GDP, to raise the price of gasoline by 20 percent, to reduce public-sector needs to 2.1 percent during 1978, and to cut real wages by 10 percent in 1978. While performance criteria for inflation in Argentina beyond three months were waived, Peru had to pledge itself to precise targets extending over one and two years—targets that took a terrible toll in lives and social disruption. When the IMF program was finally imposed last spring, it provoked riots that took more than a dozen lives.

Peru's targets were so tight and explicit that another Third World executive director, Eduardo Mayobre, representing Mexico, Venezuela and five other Central American countries, worried that the emphasis on quantitative targets was "excessive," and the Peruvian authorities "should take care that seeking those targets did not impose such a burden on the population and on economic activity that they would have to be altered, thus undermining the whole program. The targets seemed too tight, particularly since they involved measures touching investment, employment, and real salaries that were difficult to impose on any economy for long periods."

Mayobre's comments touched on a subject generally considered to be in bad taste at executive board meetings—namely the social costs to the poor of the fund's Draconian programs. Mayobre continued:

> The pledge to achieve specific targets in such a short period might lead to overexpansive policies in the future with pressure to re-establish real salaries. The targets for public finance and for prices of goods supplied by public enterprises were overambitious, given that they would be sought against the background of a virtual wage freeze. If social unrest caused the government to pursue more expansionary policies, confidence could be eroded.

He concluded with a plea to the representatives of the industrialized world to be more sensitive to Third World needs: "All standby arrangements with developing countries should take into account the special circumstances of the development process."

But the industrial country representatives defended the targets as useful politically, if not economically. "It was the determination to pursue sound policies that produced confidence, rather than the achievement of particular numerical targets," acknowledged Pendarell Kent of Great Britain. But he continued:

> Targets were necessary, though, because at a political level they could be used as a means of educating the public to the need to accept sacrifices. Generalized statements about reductions in public expenditure and real incomes, wage freezes, and so on, had less impact.

The waiver of targets for Argentina and imposition of them on Peru was only one example of the fund's sliding scale of conditionality. Another was the unusual attention paid to Peru's recent military purchases from the Soviet bloc. Normally, the executive directors eschew any discussion of a government's military expenditures even though such expenditures directly contribute to the balance-of-payments deficits and inflation that the fund is seeking to cure. Their rationale is that the IMF can only be concerned about the overall level of deficits, not their composition, which is a political decision for the government itself. Thus although the fund's own staff report revealed that South Africa increased military expenditures

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by $450 million during the same period while it was taking in $464 million from the fund, none of the executive directors rebuked South Africa even indirectly on this point.

But in the case of Peru, U.S. resentment of Peru's large arms purchases from the Soviet bloc surfaced in the executive board discussion. U.S. private banks had previously refused loans to Peru on the ground they would be used to repay the Soviet loans. In the executive board discussion on Peru, U.S. representative Thomas Leddy approved the standby arrangement but instructed the IMF staff to provide "further details on the budgetary and balance of payments consequences of recent military imports." In the structure of executive board discussions this remark constituted an unmistakable rebuke to the independent-minded Peruvian military government; in none of the discussions relating to fund members who bought their weapons in the United States did the U.S. director worry about their balance-of-payments impact.

Favors for countries that are already repressive, pressure on countries to become repressive—this is the picture of IMF operations that emerges from a reading of the fund's own executive minutes. Today the IMF is the only major spigot of U.S. aid that is not covered by some form of human rights legislation, the only spigot that is not screened for human rights by an inter-agency committee within the Carter administration. There is hope for change. In Congress, Rep. Tom Harkin (D., Iowa) is offering a human rights amendment to the IMF bill; in the administration, human rights advocates led by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher are attempting to intercept aid to repressive regimes and redirect aid programs to address basic human needs. But the Treasury Department, emboldened by public ignorance of the issue, is vigorously opposing even the mildest human rights provision for the IMF, which over the years has become one of Washington's great sacred cows —an Olympian institution embodying the economic policy makers' transcendent ideal of an open world economy freed of all trade or currency restrictions.

It is time for Congress to explain why it insists on human rights amendments on bilateral aid, but exempts the fastest growing institution of them all. It is time for the administration to explain the sense of spending $3.5 billion on the international banks to promote economic development programs, then spending another $1.8 billion on the IMF to oppose such programs. Shrouded in secrecy, obscured in a spurious technical gimmickry, little understood by Congress or the public at large, this vast and powerful institution is running out of control, encouraging dictatorship and endangering democracy throughout the developing world. □

FROSTBELT, SUNBELT AND STRAITJACKET

CARTER'S URBAN POLICY

DAVID C. PERRY & ALFRED J. WATKINS

President Carter has promised to institute a "comprehensive policy aimed both at making cities more healthy and improving the lives of people who live in them." The crux of this pronouncement is the President's reliance on a nebulous definition of urban health and his assumption that the residents of "healthy" cities are in some sense better off than the residents of "unhealthy" cities. To predict the possible effect of this policy we must discover what the President and his advisers mean by such platitudes as "health" and "improvement in people's lives."

All of the administration's pronouncements on urban health, like the text of the policy statement itself, seem to imply that such concepts are universally understood and therefore need no precise definition. But such vague usage perpetuates a tradition of mixing political rhetoric with economic reality. Rhetorically, it is commonly assumed that Houston is a "healthy" city and New York is at best "unhealthy"—some say it is "dying." In reality, this view of metropolitan development measures the condition of only one group of urban actors, the economic entrepreneurs. Thus, Houston is healthy because businessmen are successful in Houston, whereas New York is in decline because business is failing in that city. Urban health for Carter's policy makers, as for most traditional urban analysts, is a measure of the city as a center of profit: cities whose economies show rapid rates of capital accumulation and high profitability are healthy; cities with dwindling levels of capital accumulation and low profitability are unhealthy. Thus, if the President wishes to restore the health of the declining urban centers in accordance with this traditional focus, he will place the needs of the business community above the needs of everyone else.

A quick reading of the policy would suggest, however, that the President has *not* chosen this path. Rather, after a series of regional "town meetings" culminating in a week-long White House Conference on Balanced Regional Growth, Carter appears to be offering a myriad of new programs to a wide variety of urban constituents. For example:

¶He promised business and labor an economic package of labor-intensive public works projects, an economic development bank, and employment tax credits.

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¶He promised inner-city residents a social service package of health, housing and education programs, and a cultural arts program.

¶He promised the leaders of fiscally strained state and local governments a revised revenue sharing program targeted to those areas with the greatest incidence of long-term unemployment.

¶He promised neighborhood leaders a community organization program coupled with support for locally based law-enforcement and credit union initiatives.

But there is a serious discrepancy between such promises and the actual steps that are being proposed to carry out the policy. Consequently, a more fundamental question arises: can cities that are economically more healthy provide a more desirable environment in which all people (not only economic entrepreneurs) can live with respect and dignity? We believe that, despite Carter's promises, all the available economic evidence suggests that they cannot. The state of affairs in the cities of both the Sunbelt and the Northeast indicates that poverty is a necessary but not sufficient correlate of urban health. It is necessary for the reason that low wages are a precondition and indeed a prerequisite for high profits. Yet the mere presence of large pools of poverty-stricken urbanites is not sufficient to guarantee urban health. If it were there would be few, if any, differences between the well-being of cities in the Sunbelt and the Northeast.

What distinguishes these two regions is not the incidence of their poverty but their ability to utilize poverty as a resource for generating profits. In the Northeastern cities, poverty is not conducive to urban health because the poverty population comprises a contentious group of individuals who resist participation in a labor market where incomes are too low to guarantee a living wage. Attempts to pacify and control these people with expensive social welfare programs are viewed as precipitating inordinately high taxes and hence directing public and private funds away from profitable investment ventures. Under these circumstances, poverty attacks the health of the cities and is a major cause of their fiscal crisis.

By comparison, Sunbelt poverty is composed of large pools of docile, low-wage workers whose lack of political militancy, disgracefully low level of publicly supported social services, and dearth of union organization represent a locational advantage for business and is a major ingredient contributing to the "good business climate" of the region. Sunbelt poverty is tailor-made to promote healthy cities and if President Carter is serious about his desire to restore health to the Northeastern cities, his policies will have to make poverty as profitable for Northeastern corporations as it is at present for Sunbelt corporations. Unfortunately, if he succeeds on the business front, he will raise doubts about his promise to make the Northeastern cities desirable places in which to live.

We can highlight this dilemma by avoiding the usual aggregate measures of urban poverty and focusing instead on the components of a new labor market index known as subemployment. This index was developed by several economists who believed that the accepted index of labor market conditions—the unemployment rate—presents an incomplete picture since it includes only individuals who are both without a job and actively searching for one. Thus, in addition to the traditional unemployment rate, the subemployment index is composed of discouraged workers (those who are no longer looking for work because they believe that they will be unable to find a job at a *satisfactory wage*), involuntary part-time workers (those who can find only part-time employment despite a professed desire to work full time) and workers who are fully employed but whose total annual earnings leave them below a minimal adequate income level. In computing the subemployment rate, two cutoff points have been used to define the minimum adequate income level —the Social Security Administration's official poverty line and the Bureau of Labor Statistics' "minimum adequate family budget." In 1970, the only year for which sufficient data are available for our purposes, the poverty line was approximately $4,000 per year for a family of four and the BLS set its cutoff point at $7,000.

According to our analysis of a selected group of eighteen Northeastern and Sunbelt cities, the total subemployment in the two regions is almost identical, with the Sunbelt exhibiting a slightly higher incidence than the Northeast. This approximate equality, by itself, should support the contention that the status of the urban poor is at best only marginally influenced by the economic health of a region. But when we break the subemployment index down into its various components, we find strong regional variations in the composition of subemployment and these patterns suggest that poverty produces very different conditions in the two regions.

From the first two components—the unemployed and the discouraged jobless—one can derive the first major qualitative dimension of poverty: workers whose lack of a job or intransigence in the face of low wages unfits them as resources for capital accumulation. On this score, the Northeastern cities are obviously less healthy than their Sunbelt counterparts. A person living in a ghetto area of a major Northeastern central city is much less likely than a Sunbelt ghetto resident to have a job. In fact, within the group of Northeastern cities the discouraged jobless alone make up 49.8 percent of the subemployed population.

The remaining components of the index are the work-

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ers who are employed only part time or for substandard wages. For these workers, conditions in the Sunbelt are more dismal than those in the Northeast. The evidence is particularly striking for full-time workers who fall below the poverty line. Ghetto residents in Sunbelt cities, while much more likely to be working, are also more likely to be receiving inadequate wages. Thus, subemployment in the Sunbelt is largely the result of low-paying jobs, with 73.5 percent of the region's subemployed inner-city heads of households unable to lift themselves above the poverty line.

We conclude from this analysis, then, that people living below the poverty line in the urban South and Southwest are a profitable resource to be exploited by employers of cheap labor, whereas in the Northeast the intransigence of ghetto residents who see little difference between taking a job which guarantees them poverty and remaining unemployed is a barrier to profitability and the establishment of healthy cities. Our review of the Carter policy indicates that this unprofitable characteristic of poverty is precisely what the President wishes to eliminate.

The early briefing documents, press statements and political testimonials which have accompanied the administration's announcement of "new" and "comprehensive" policy all suggest that the "new partnership" is, at best, heavily tilted to give the business community an advantage over state and local governments as well as the remaining portions of the urban population.

Of the approximately $8.3 billion proposed for the first two years of the plan, the greater part is directed *not* toward the poor and the conditions of human distress in which they live. A little more than $800 million, or slightly less than 10 percent of the funding, is designated for social services, art, parks, recreation, health and neighborhood development. Another 14 percent ($1.2 billion) is earmarked for state and local fiscal relief and the bulk of these funds comes from a formulaic revision of Gerald Ford's Anti-Recession Revenue Sharing Program.

The remaining 75 percent of the funds proposed in the Carter plan go, directly or indirectly, to the business community. This money is split rather evenly between programs designed to encourage investment in the central cities and programs that subsidize businesses which hire the chronically unemployed. The largest component of the Carter "Employment and Economic Development" package is a loan-guarantee program to be administered by a National Development Bank. The bank will have a three-year funding authorization of $11 billion to supply guaranteed loans to business at interest rates as low as 2.5 percent and covering up to 60 percent of their initial capital expenditures. Coupled with this loan-guarantee program is a set of tax credits and economic development grants that will further reduce investment risks in the central cities. However, it would be wrong to assume that this proposal merely dangles capital subsidies and risk abatement before the central city businessmen. It contains much more than a simple inducement to locate new economic ventures "downtown." Along with the carrot of business subsidies there is the stick of social cutbacks and worker "give-backs" which are also designed to improve the "health" of these cities. Felix Rohatyn, the head of the Municipal Assistance Corporation and one of the earliest proponents of an Urban Development Bank, explained the changes in the political environment that should accompany a successful development bank:

> We need to make changes in the business tax structure, or changes are needed in union work rules. . . . Because of the possibility of economic activity, the governors will accept political change. What we are creating is a way to give politicians the excuse to do what they know ought to be done anyway. That's the way we got reforms in New York City's government. Every few weeks another bond issue had to be sold. Each required concessions.

In view of Rohatyn's rather candid remarks, it remains to be seen how Carter plans to couple the successful implementation of his proposal with his concomitant pledge to make cities more desirable places in which to live.

The second largest programmatic unit of the Carter policy is a tax-credit initiative of $1.5 billion that offers tax breaks to industries which hire and train the hard-core unemployed. This inducement is in addition to a program designed to generate jobs in construction through an annual allotment of $1 billion for labor-intensive, soft, public works projects. While these are short-term jobs, lasting only for the duration of the projects, the administration estimates that the program will give work to 60,000 people a year during the two-year course of the program.

On their face these programs are not without merit, but they do not add up to a "new" and "comprehensive" approach to solving the contradictory climate of urban America. This is no frontal attack on the social and economic oppression experienced by legions of urbanites. Carter's primary goal is obviously to establish a central city climate that will once again raise capital accumulation to "healthy" levels. Nowhere does the policy attempt to guard against the possibility that it might "solve" the unemployment "problem" in the Northeast by making labor as exploitable in New York as it now is in Houston.

Indeed, Carter's job incentive venture would at once reorganize the sporadic nature of the "unreliable" sector of the labor force known as the structurally unemployed and subsidize industry to the point where it could hire such risky souls at a rate that would be "profitable." It seeks to train the "unreliables" in the hope that they will work at wages which, while scarcely brilliant, are still higher than industry was previously willing to pay. In return for improvement of their prospects, the urban poor are expected to accept jobs that are obviously of low quality and minimal dignity.

In a sense, this is a change from the approach of the 1960s when the federal government attempted to make the poor a more attractive labor pool by educating them. That approach was scrapped as soon as it was realized that it raised the material expectations of the poor without assuring them of jobs to match such expectations.

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Instead of stimulating the poor, Carter hopes to stimulate industry. He hopes through business subsidies to establish levels of pay high enough to attract the poor to jobs they would otherwise refuse. He is concentrating on a program not of "education" but of "socialization," whereby the poor will learn to accept jobs requiring little skill and affording little dignity. In short, the poor will learn to accept their traditional lot in life.

The Carter plan fits perfectly the old criteria and the traditional models of public sector reform and economic change: support the urban entrepreneur and enlarge the capillaries of "trickle down." Without doubt the interests of business and not the needs of the urban poor are the dominant considerations behind the Carter proposal. If our understanding of history and contemporary conditions is correct, such a strategy, for all its *rhetorical* fanfare, is not new but simply "business as usual." The bulk of what financial and programmatic muscle can be found in the policy is decidedly skewed toward making the city first and foremost a center of profit, with the allied hope that it will in consequence become a center of human renewal.

But there will never be an urban policy that truly relieves the conditions of human distress until the government desists from subordinating the needs for human renewal to the demands of increased profit. A new urban policy should start from the premise that "healthy" cities are first and foremost communities of social well-being and that the cities' economic productivity is a secondary consideration, a means to accomplish such well-being. In the wake of the current regional shift of people and economy to the Sunbelt, the greater part of Carter's fiscal and programmatic initiatives in the South should be hedged around with guarantees that the employed workers of the region will finally gain incomes that bring them above the "minimum adequate family budget." It should, at the very least, call for repeal of Section 14B of the Taft-Hartley Act, so that Sunbelt workers can at last organize strong unions in this, the solid "right to work" region of the United States. Further, the policy should put a preponderant share of money and programs into an assault on the backwardness of the Sunbelt in the areas of welfare, education, housing and health care. Its initiatives in the older cities of the Northeast should soundly support the social programs that have sprouted there, although in a confused and immature form.

Such a program, incorporating a well-defined agenda for social renewal of Sunbelt cities as well as Northeastern urban centers, coupled with nonoppressive economic incentives for business to locate in the distressed cities, would cut the comparative *"advantage"* the Sunbelt maintains by its niggardly public commitments to human needs and concomitant subservience to the needs of business.

As it now stands, Carter's policy follows a time-honored course which will effectively punish the people and cities of the Northeast for their experiments in social renewal, in order to bring them more in line with the cities of the Sunbelt. It would bring the distressed cities of the United States back, hat in hand, to the doorstep of business rather than forward through new doors of social change.

In short, the President never acknowledges, much less addresses, the primary contradiction in cities between profitability and human renewal. His proposal, therefore, is not new, comprehensive, or capable of "making cities more healthy and improving the lives of the people who live in them." □

HOPES THAT WENT GLIMMERING

NEW LIGHT ON THE A-BOMB RACE

BARTON J. BERNSTEIN

"History and the peoples whom we represent will not forgive us if we do not use this opportunity fully," declared Yugoslav Deputy Minister Lazar Mojsov when he opened the U.N. General Assembly's five-week Special Session on Disarmament. (See the special Disarmament issue of *The Nation*, May 27.) The major powers, he warned, have the capacity to "kill several times over every man, woman, and child in the world." Moreover, the arms race, Mojsov and other speakers lamented, costs more than $400 billion a year. Many participants blamed the United States and the Soviet Union for failing to achieve nuclear disarmament. Some deplored the missed opportunities of the first years after Hiroshima—the Baruch Plan in 1946 for international control of atomic energy; the refusal in 1949-50 to eschew the H-bomb; the unsuccessful Soviet-American negotiations in 1955 and 1957 on cutback of forces and nuclear disarmament.

But were opportunities missed? How likely in 1946 was agreement on the Baruch Plan? Was it a generous offer, as most Americans believed, or a cynical propaganda ploy, as some later interpreters have argued? When that plan emerged America had for four years been systematically excluding the USSR from participation in the A-bomb project. Roosevelt initiated the policy of exclusion and Truman continued it. During World War II, both Presidents believed that a nuclear monopoly would give the United States valuable options. The bomb could be a counterweight to Soviet armies, a deterrent to aggression, an implied or explicit threat, a bargaining chip,

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or an actual combat weapon. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Truman administration did use the bomb as an implied threat to soften Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, and apparently gained some small concessions. Ultimately, however, the Soviets became intransigent, probably fearing that minor concessions could only beget bolder American demands, and probably also realizing that Truman would not use the bomb in combat to settle disputes in Eastern Europe.

Persuaded that the A-bomb was not winning diplomatic victories, and pressed by American scientists and liberal Democrats to seek nuclear disarmament, Truman and his Secretary of State, James Byrnes, decided in late 1945 to offer a program for international control of atomic energy. This, the widely heralded Baruch Plan, required on-site inspections, elimination of the Security Council veto on sanctions, and ultimate U.N. control of all nuclear materials and plants. It allowed the United States to go on making bombs, but barred the Soviets from such work.

The key provision, which actually protected America's nuclear monopoly, was the requirement that in stages spread over a period of some four to six years the United States would make the secret data on atomic energy available to a U.N. authority. The effect of the "stages" requirement can be imagined by asking what would have happened if, after a few years but before complete implementation of the plan, the United States had decided the Soviets were cheating. The United States could then have cut off the data and the Soviets, barred from atomic research in the interim, would have been almost as far from developing the bomb as when the plan began. In effect, the Baruch Plan required the Soviets to sit back and trust the United States. In the public debates, Russia did not dwell upon the system of stages, probably because it feared that raising the monopoly issue would emphasize its value and the Soviet weakness. The USSR objected primarily to the suspension of the Security Council veto, no doubt because they saw it as a dangerous precedent for the American attempt to dominate the U.N. The Soviets also worried about on-site inspection, because that would penetrate their curtain of secrecy and reveal the weakness of their war-ravaged economy as well as the location of key military installations.

American leaders had hoped with the Baruch Plan to retain the monopoly for a few years, during which a stable peace might be shaped, and then turn nuclear energy over to international control shortly before the Soviets might otherwise have developed the bomb. Given these aims, why didn't American leaders foresee that the plan would be unacceptable to the Soviets? The answer is that they were so worried lest their right-wing critics charge "sell out" that they gave little thought to Soviet needs. They actually believed that they were being generous.

By 1946, no conceivable plan could have been acceptable to both great powers. Each harbored such mistrust of the other that neither would have taken the risks necessary to reach agreement. Earlier, however, Roosevelt and Truman had greater flexibility, *if* they had wished to use it. During World War II, when the A-bomb project was a closely held secret and Russia was an ally, Roosevelt had been politically free to make the Soviets a partner in the project. Instead, he acted systematically to exclude the Soviets, hoping later to profit from "atomic diplomacy." And Truman, in turn, hoped to reap the same benefits.

Would American security have been in jeopardy if Truman had given the Soviet Union the A-bomb secrets in 1946? As matters turned out, little would have changed. The Soviets would probably have developed the bomb in 1948, rather than in 1949, and the American monopoly would have ended a year or so earlier. But in 1945-46, with citizens demanding great reductions in conventional forces, leaders in Washington were unwilling to give up the bomb in the near future. They did not believe that, bomb or no bomb, the Soviets would attack Western Europe, but the monopoly gave them a greater feeling of confidence. They thought it compensated for America's comparative weakness in conventional forces.

Opportunities were missed before Hiroshima, and possibly in the few months after V-J Day, but the Baruch Plan was not a missed opportunity. It came too late and was too unfair. Unfortunately, most Americans, unable to grasp the one-sidedness of the plan, interpreted the Soviet rejection as additional evidence of Russian malevolence.

When the Soviets detonated their first atomic bomb in August 1949, the Truman administration responded by increasing the atomic arms budget, speeding work on tactical nuclear weapons and on development of the 200 to 500 kiloton "booster" (a fission bomb boosted by a small fusion reaction). The troubling question was whether to build the H-bomb, with a potential of many megatons.

It would be strategically unnecessary, potentially genocidal and immoral, prominent scientific advisers argued. They explained that the H-bomb would be too large, since the Soviets had few big cities, and probably not cost efficient, in view of the presumably decisive results of fission weapons. These scientists, led by J. Robert Oppenheimer, protested that America was relying too heavily on its nuclear arsenal and missing an opportunity to slow the arms race and seek international control of atomic energy.

Was a plan for international control possible in 1949-50? George Kennan struggled for a few months to define a new proposal. In view of recent Soviet statements, he thought that the Soviets might agree to inspection. But the basic problem, as Kennan privately lamented, was that American military planning depended upon nuclear weapons and therefore the United States did not want international control. Our leaders publicly called for international control while counting on the Soviets to reject the American plan. Kennan pleaded for a new approach that moved away from the Baruch Plan's suspension of the veto and implementation by long stages.

The arguments of Kennan and Oppenheimer won no favor with Secretary of State Dean Acheson or President Truman. Acheson believed that international control was impossible and undesirable, that the Soviets were intransigent and perfidious, and that they would only respect American military strength. He wanted the H-bomb and whatever additional military power the budget-balancing

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President would allow. In addition, both he and Truman believed that Congress and many citizens would skewer the administration if it did not support the H-bomb. Accordingly, in late January 1950, Truman ordered accelerated work to determine whether the H-bomb was feasible, and in early March he committed himself to building the weapon if it could be done.

In the six weeks between these two decisions, public opinion shifted significantly. In a first poll, about half the population believed that the United States "should try again to work out an agreement with Russia to control the atom bomb before we make a hydrogen bomb"; by early March, the support for "negotiations first" had increased to 68 percent. These responses suggest that the government had more room to maneuver on the H-bomb than Acheson and Truman believed—or at least wanted to believe. Public opinion would have allowed serious negotiations wtih the Soviet Union, but the administration did not try even to formulate a plan that might have been acceptable.

The result instead was an H-bomb race. The United States made a critical thermonuclear experiment in the spring of 1951, exploded the first thermonuclear device in November 1952, and tested the first thermonuclear bomb in March 1954. The Soviets, though lagging, gained valuable data from these tests, and exploded their first H-bomb in November 1955—twenty months after the Americans.

What would have happened if the administration had followed the advice of leading scientists and forsworn the H-bomb—at least until the Soviets revealed that they would not? Herbert York, former director of the Lawrence-Livermore weapons laboratory, has argued, by extrapolating from actual developments in the 1950s, that America would have been in no danger. He considers three possible courses of events—"best," "worst plausible" and "most probable." At "best," both nations would have abandoned the H-bomb. If the Soviets had started to work on it first, the "worst plausible" course would have been that the two nations would have had the bomb at about the same time. The Soviet preliminary test of August 1953 would have alerted the United States, and it could have gone to work, developing the bomb by late 1955 or early 1956. In the "most probable" course, the Soviets, though starting first, would not have achieved a bomb until 1958 or early 1959. Because their program was heavily imitative, as Oppenheimer explained in 1949, they would have been slowed by being unable to secure data from the American tests of 1951 and 1952. There would not have been any American tests. But when the Soviets did conduct a test, the United States would have known of it, joined the race, and probably beaten the Soviets by about three years. American forbearance, then, would not have injured the United States, but might have impeded the Soviets. York concludes that the United States missed an important opportunity to slow the arms race and to avoid the next dangerous step in escalation.

But what would have happened, some critics might ask, if events had turned out differently but still plausibly —if the Soviets had been quicker to develop the H-bomb and the United States slower? Suppose the Soviets had developed the bomb a year earlier (1954) than they did, and the United States, first delaying, then rushing to catch up, had taken about four years. The Soviets would have had the H-bomb by 1954 and the United States not until 1957. Even so, the United States had enough planes and fission bombs to make a Soviet first-strike suicidal. The worst that would have happened is that America would not have had nuclear superiority during the early Eisenhower years, and thus the administration could not have claimed to rely upon the doctrine of "massive retaliation": the threat of being able to choose the means and place of retaliation, even in response to nonnuclear wars in the Third World. But that doctrine, announced in 1954, was probably never credible to the Soviets, and their nuclear buildup, as well as Eisenhower's own state-



Liederman, Long Island Press

"So You Want Parity?"

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ments, undermined it by about 1956.

Oppenheimer and his associates had given American leaders wise counsel in 1949-50, but Truman and Acheson were not looking to slow or halt the arms race. They wanted to win it. Only great superiority, they believed, would enable America to block revolution in the Third World and to defend Europe—both areas being deemed invaluable to the American political economy.

On May 10, 1955, the Soviet Union shocked American leaders by accepting their plan for a reduction of combat forces and for international control of atomic energy, with inspection. Dismayed, America withdrew its plan, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles lamely explaining that inspection could not be foolproof. Dulles did not add that American leaders had recognized this weakness for years, and that they were now simply trying to squirm out of an unpleasant situation. They could hardly acknowledge that they had been using the plan merely for propaganda purposes.

For their part, the Soviets were probably not sincere in accepting the American plan. They knew that Eisenhower, having inherited it from the Truman administration, had given the matter little thought except to exploit its propaganda value. They also knew that the President had just appointed a special assistant on disarmament, Harold Stassen, who was unprepared for such a Soviet initiative. The Russians immediately argued their own case in the international press, and that makes it seem that they, too, were more eager to win propaganda victories than to conduct serious negotiations. Possibly to make certain that their own offer would be unacceptable, they seemed to insist upon liquidation of America's NATO and SEATO bases as part of the deal.

The Eisenhower administration cynically shifted international attention by proposing "Open Skies": the two nations would exchange blueprints of military bases and conduct aerial photography over each other's territory, thus decreasing the likelihood of surprise attack. The offer, widely heralded as bold and imaginative, was actually self-serving and predictably unacceptable. The United States, a relatively open society, had been unable to conceal much information about the location of bases and industries; the Soviet Union, a relatively closed society, had been more successful. The plan would have given the Soviets data they already possessed, and the United States would have learned what it might not otherwise have been able to discover. The Americans expected the Soviets to reject "Open Skies," and when they did so, the United States won a propaganda "victory."

In 1956, Eisenhower proposed a freeze or even reduction of nuclear stockpiles. Since the Soviets still had fewer such weapons, that proposal was also predictably unsuccessful. At the same time, though the United States had rejected Soviet offers for mutual cutbacks in conventional forces, the Soviets were substantially reducing their conventional forces—by about 650,000 in 1955 and 1.2 million in 1956.

In 1957, before the launching of Sputnik, negotiations were renewed on conventional and nuclear strength. With the two powers near parity in nuclear weapons, the United States recommended a halt to production of nuclear bombs, restrictions on nuclear tests, and the reduction of military budgets by 10 percent. The Soviets, troubled because Britain had become a nuclear power and fearing that France and Germany might join the "nuclear club," wanted to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. They also approved of aerial inspection, proposed reductions in conventional forces, recommended a ban on ICBMs, and relaxed their demands for elimination of overseas bases. According to participants, both sides showed flexibility in the early discussions, and the talk seemed serious.

However, the negotiations fell victim to the fears and interests of America's NATO allies and to the hostility of Secretary of State Dulles. After gaining approval from Eisenhower, but without first consulting NATO allies, Harold Stassen, the American negotiator, approached the Soviets with a proposal to bar nonnuclear powers from producing such weapons, and to freeze bomb production in about two years. America's allies were angry at being bypassed, and some were outraged by the implications. Britain, having recently developed the bomb, wanted to build a stockpile; France expected to develop the bomb, and both countries charged America with "selling out" their interests. American policy in Europe rested upon NATO, and Stassen's paper and tactics threatened that structure. To add to the pressure, Konrad Adenauer of Germany, joining Dulles, asserted that German reunification must precede any disarmament. Stassen, reprimanded by Eisenhower, soon resigned, and Dulles, who opposed any arms settlement, led the new American propaganda campaign to appear generous while avoiding serious negotiations.

Negotiations in 1957 could have been fruitful and produced a limited settlement only if Dulles had been weaker and if America's major NATO allies had been willing to drop the idea of becoming substantial nuclear powers. America was too deeply entwined in the fortunes of major European nations to break free of the alliance.

To sum up, the first twelve years of the nuclear arms race does reveal some missed opportunities. The greatest opportunity, however, occurred before Hiroshima. During World War II, neither Roosevelt nor Truman wanted to invite the Soviets into atomic partnership. The Baruch Plan of 1946 was not a missed opportunity; it was simply unacceptable. If America had renounced the H-bomb in 1950, that might have slowed the arms race, and would not have been risky, but the Truman administration easily rejected this course. The Soviets in 1955 were probably not sincere in accepting the American proposal, for both nations had come to use negotiations for propaganda, not progress toward peace. But the discussions of 1957, with their more modest aims, might have produced a limited settlement. By falling victim in part to the needs of NATO allies, these negotiations emphasized the increasing difficulties of slowing the arms race and moving toward disarmament.

This past summer, the delegates at the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament saw a similar pattern: Carter

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sent Vice President Walter Mondale to the U.N. to express America's noble intentions and to blame the Soviets for escalating the arms race, while the President stayed in Washington to negotiate with NATO partners ways to strengthen this military alliance. The result was a NATO agreement to increase military spending by as much as $100 billion in the next decade, with the United States contributing about half. Was Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev wrong to accuse America and its NATO allies of "hypocrisy" when they talk of disarmament? □

POLLUTION & FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE

THE SEA ITSELF MAY DIE

PETER J. BERNSTEIN

"Subsidy" is a term offensive to sensitive oil-industry ears, but it defines accurately a range of financial benefits that America bestows on its largest industry by allowing oil firms to register their tanker fleets under flags of convenience. The arrangement whereby oil companies register tankers in Liberia, Panama and other small nonseafaring nations means they do not have to pay American corporate taxes, build ships in American yards, pay union wages to American crews or submit to American safety standards. Instead of an income tax, the firms pay the government of Liberia, for example, a modest annual registration fee based on ship tonnage. Liberia now has the world's largest merchant marine, and no group has taken greater advantage of this tax haven than the American shippers: 35 to 40 percent of Liberia's tanker tonnage is U.S.-owned, and an additional 10 percent is U.S.-financed. The companies say they could not compete with ships from other nations if forced to operate oceangoing tankers under the American flag.

There would not necessarily be anything reprehensible in this quest for profits, but for the fact that the owners who have been using it are building tankers that are bigger, and more dangerous. A little history shows that a disproportionate number of accidents at sea involve flag-of-convenience tankers. Such vessels, together with others from Greece, Formosa and the Philippines, have dominated the marine casualty lists for some time; each year for the past decade Liberia has had the biggest total losses of any country. Last year, according to the Tanker Advisory Center, New York, most of the tankers lost at sea were sailing under either Liberian or Panamanian flags. Liberian casualties alone accounted for roughly half the 60 million gallons of oil spilled into the sea.

Starting with the *Torrey Canyon*, most of the oil-spill disasters of the past eleven years have involved Liberian ships owned or leased by major oil companies. These have included the *Ocean Eagle*, whose wreck fouled the beaches of San Juan, Puerto Rico, in 1967; the *Arrow*, which bathed 60 miles of Nova Scotia shoreline in black goo in 1970, and the *Juliana*, which in 1971 gave Japan its worst oil spill when it broke in two after hitting a breakwater off the port of Niigata.

More recently, the *Argo Merchant*, a rusty vessel of shadowy ownership, split apart off Nantucket two winters ago and came perilously close to inflicting massive damage on the Georges Bank fishing ground. This was, at the time, one of the biggest spills on record, but it lost this distinction last March, when another Liberian-flag tanker, the 228,513-ton *Amoco Cadiz*, ran aground off the coast of France and spilled its entire cargo of 68 million gallons of Arabian crude oil. The full dimensions of that catastrophe in terms of the destruction of a rich fishery, the loss of bird life, including populations of rare sea birds, the loss of a major recreational resource, the damage to wetlands, and the loss of livelihood to the Breton fishermen will not be known for some time, if ever.

As only the latest in a long series of shipwrecks, the *Amoco Cadiz* underscores the fact that nothing has yet been done to keep the hazard of tanker spills from growing ever larger and more disastrous. One of the neglected lessons is the need for better seamanship on busy sea lanes. The Italian master of the rudderless *Amoco Cadiz* did not judge he was in grave danger until it was too late. More than 300 million tons of oil pass up the English Channel in a year, and many vessels have been lost in the treacherous straits. Although the entrance to the channel, where the *Amoco Cadiz* ran aground, is 100 miles wide, the tanker was hugging the French coast only 5 miles from shore. An absurd sensitivity to the concept of freedom of the seas has limited the kind of traffic rules that can be applied in those waters.

Tanker safety design has not caught up with the spectacular increase of ship sizes that makes the mammoth vessels inherently accident-prone. The *Amoco Cadiz*, owned by Standard Oil of Indiana and built in Spain in 1974 for $35 million, had no backup steering controls, which would have cost an extra $500,000. The ship did have duplicate engine systems but they depended on a single hydraulic transmission line—which failed. With the power gone, the ship lost steerageway and efforts to control it were futile.

Under outdated maritime law, the ancient rights of salvage companies are almost as sacrosanct as the freedom of the seas. Salvage awards, calculated from the value of the ship as well as its cargo, can be enormous, and the inevitable litigation on the matter is itself a huge expense. That may explain why the master of the *Amoco Cadiz* was in contact by radiotelephone with the ship's Chicago-based owners and haggled with a salvage tug for twelve hours while his vessel drifted helplessly toward

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the rocks of Portsall, near Brest. French authorities said the first SOS message they received came after the ship was already firmly grounded. The delay suggests that arrangements for striking a contract at sea are impracticable, or downright dangerous. Salvage should no longer be regarded as a private matter between shipowners and their would-be rescuers.

Once the wreck occurred, French officials fretted and feuded over what to do just long enough for a spring storm to break up the hull and make sure every drop of the cargo escaped. It is evident from the magnitude of the spill that there is no assurance Standard Oil will make full restitution to France and to the people of Brittany. Under existing international law and voluntary agreements, an initial amount of damages from tanker spills can be paid without the need to go to court and determine fault. The owner of a larger tanker is required to pay initial damages up to about $17 million, no matter who is at fault, and an international fund covers additional damages up to about $30 million—but ecological damages may not be covered.

With the effects of the *Amoco Cadiz* spill expected to persist for a decade or more, the total damage could far exceed the $30 million maximum. A group of French citizens, including hotel owners and fishermen, have brought a class action suit in the United States against Standard Oil of Indiana.

The wreck of the *Amoco Cadiz* represents a part of the pollution problem associated with oil tankers that is both dramatic and easy to grasp. A recent analysis by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment shows that from 1969 to 1974 more than 500 tanker accidents involved oil spills, and that, in all, more than a million tons of oil escaped.

As would be expected, the accidents reported included many groundings, collisions and explosions. But one of the more frequent happenings was listed under the heading of "structural failure," which in the most severe cases meant that an old rust-bucket had simply broken up at sea. In fact, structural failures were responsible for nearly a third of all the oil that poured into the oceans, even more than was lost from groundings and collisions.

What makes this particularly ominous is the fact that almost all of the present generation of giant supertankers were launched within the last decade. In 1966 there was only one tanker in the world greater than 200,000 deadweight tons; today there are 725 of them in a world tanker population of about 6,800. By contrast, the *Torrey Canyon,* fully laden, was only 120,000 tons. If past experience with other classes of tankers can be taken as a guide, in the 1980s, when these superships are about fifteen years old, the incidence of structural failures—and catastrophic oil spills—will rise dramatically. As oil imports keep growing, tankers of the type Noel Mostert warned about in *Supership* will become an increasingly common menace off U.S. shores. Already their mammoth hulks can be seen in coastal waters off Florida, Texas and California. "We kid ourselves if we think we can't have an *Amoco Cadiz* right here," Sam Bleicher, director of the U.S. Office of Ocean Management, told me.



Margulies

The other part of the pollution problem associated with tankers stems from routine tank cleaning and ballasting operations. Probably most of the oil dumped into the sea comes from the flushing out of ships' tanks as they head for the Persian Gulf or wherever to get another cargo. Some wait until they get to the deeper ocean; many don't. Shippers routinely clean out their tanks at night so they can get rid of their oily swill without detection. And some pollution is inevitable when sea-water ballast is discharged from tanks that earlier contained crude oil or petroleum products. A sure way to prevent this pollution is to provide segregated ballast tanks, an arrangement that would reduce cargo space by no more than 10 percent.

With a segregated ballast system, all tanks and piping for ballast are completely separate from those for crude oil or petroleum products. An additional advantage of the segregated ballast system is that the tanks can be so placed as to give the vessel some protection in the event of a grounding or collision. It's a terrible irony that the *Amoco Cadiz* disaster occurred scarcely one month after delegates to a United Nations' conference on tanker safety rejected an American proposal that segregated ballast be required on big tankers now in operation as well as on those yet to be built.

Instead of establishing effective regulations for the world tanker fleet, delegates to the International Conference on Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention settled for some weak alternatives tailored to suit multinational shippers. Although some seventy countries participated in the two-week session, held in February at the Cunard International Hotel on the outskirts of London, only a handful showed any serious interest in minimizing the possibility of wrecks and spills.

Great Britain, itself a shipowner since it holds a majority share in British Petroleum, led the opposition to the American proposal that all tankers above 20,000 deadweight tons should be fitted with segregated ballast systems. Many delegates of less-developed nations were part of this opposition. They seemed persuaded that retrofitting segregated ballast systems on existing tankers is a luxury for the rich, even though it is estimated that the world's entire tanker fleet could be equipped with such systems at relatively minor cost to the consumer, perhaps an additional half cent a gallon for gasoline.

For existing ships so-called crude oil washing was accepted as an alternative to segregated ballast. In this

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system, crude oil is used as a solvent to remove much of the "clingage" before the tanks are used again to carry ballast. British Petroleum and Exxon developed the crude oil washing system five years ago. It has two shortcomings: it is extremely difficult to enforce and, when used, it leaves in the tanks roughly a third of the clingage, to be dumped at sea. The U.S. delegation had argued that, while crude oil washing would be a valuable supplement to segregated ballast, it would not be an adequate substitution.

Crude oil washing can also create an air pollution problem, especially for ports in large metropolitan areas where hydrocarbon emissions are already excessive. The California Air Pollution Board opposes its use.

The group that sponsored the tanker conference was the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, generally known as IMCO, a specialized U.N. agency based in London. IMCO has more than 100 member nations but is dominated by the dozen or so top maritime powers. The countries that participate are assessed according to the gross tonnage of their tanker fleets. (Liberia is the biggest contributor to IMCO's upkeep.) As a result, IMCO acts only if the main maritime powers reach a consensus, which means that it rarely, if ever, adopts a measure deemed unacceptable by shipowners. IMCO is regarded by some tough-minded politicians (for example, Sens. Russell Long of Louisiana and Warren Magnuson of Washington) as a forum dominated by the oil companies.

After an intensive weekend of negotiations at the February conference, the United States delegation managed to obtain stricter rules on tanker inspections, radar navigation aids, backup steering gear, and gas inerting systems to reduce the possibility of explosions. But IMCO rejected U.S. proposals for mandatory double bottom construction for all new tankers. Virtually all other types of merchant vessels have either double bottoms or double hulls. But the oil companies, citing some of their own studies and those of the U.S. Coast Guard, insisted that double bottoms present a safety hazard. Explosive mixtures of gas, industry officials said, could become trapped between the inner and outer shells. Thus, IMCO settled for an ineffectual regulation under which vessels would be allowed to use strategically placed ballast tanks to protect cargo holds.

At the moment, however, few new tankers are being built. The worldwide drop in oil consumption has caused a major slump in shipping. With about 15 percent of the world tanker fleet laid up, including a third of the supertankers, ships with an additional 30 million tons of tank capacity are sitting in drydocks in various stages of completion. Shipping experts believe the slump will persist through 1985, perhaps longer. "It appears that the oil embargo taught people a real lesson in energy conservation," said Arthur McKenzie, director of the Tanker Advisory Center. "Outside the United States the world economy has not snapped back fast enough to help the situation." Because ships currently in use will make up much the greater part of the world tanker fleet for many years to come, IMCO's rejection of mandatory segregated ballast on existing vessels is especially serious.

Industry lobbyists played an important role in preliminary technical meetings, and at the plenary session of the London conference of fourteen nongovernmental organizations accredited to participate in the deliberations, thirteen represented oil and shipping interests. The exception, Friends of the Earth, was represented by a part-time shipping consultant who spoke in behalf of environmental interests. The key industry group was the Oil Companies International Marine Forum which represents oil firms owning 90 percent of the petroleum that moves on the high seas. William Gray, an Exxon naval architect and the forum's chief spokesman, chaired IMCO's all-important technical committee. With the eventual defeat of the U.S. proposals for double bottoms on new tankers and segregated ballast on existing vessels, Gray could boast at the close of the conference that the final IMCO accord was "small potatoes."

Despite the timidity of the accord, all the interested agencies in Washington, including the Council on Environmental Quality and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, believe it represents significant progress and deserves early ratification. But if IMCO's past performance is any guide, ratification won't be easy. For an IMCO convention to become binding, it must be ratified by twenty-five member nations accounting for at least half of the world's tanker tonnage. An accord adopted in 1973 that deals with oil spills and liability is still awaiting ratification. Not one major maritime nation, including the United States, has ratified it.

To its credit, the Carter administration is taking steps to implement all the agreed-upon IMCO measures, whether or not they're ratified. All incoming tankers are being inspected periodically to determine whether they are seaworthy. In addition, the Coast Guard expects to begin enforcing soon a just-completed IMCO accord on the training and certification of tanker crews. Liberia and other flag-of-convenience countries are notably lax in their manning standards, allowing many tankers to set sail without the crew strength that is needed in emergencies. The accord on crew standards was signed by seventy-two nations on July 7, but, as with other IMCO agreements, enforcement is left to each maritime country. Judging from the time it takes to get any accord generally approved, the feeling is that the purity and survival of the oceans has a low priority with most members of IMCO.

That being the case, the United States could take unilateral action, as it did two years ago to limit foreign fishing in American coastal waters. The Coast Guard is considering more rigorous standards, including segregated ballast, for all U.S.-flag tankers that carry oil from one American port to another or from offshore production wells. But why not impose the same rigorous safety code on oceangoing tankers that enter American ports? Tankers, like cruise ships, are switched from route to route, as business requires. Any new code imposed on tankers calling at American ports would soon make itself felt upon all ships. The alternative is to accept the fact that, until oil is replaced as the world's principal source of energy, the devastating black tide that fell upon Brittany will befoul many other shores, again and again. And the sea itself will become filthy; it may even die. □

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

Network Capers: The Insider's Scoop

AIR TIME: The Inside Story of *CBS News*. *By Gary Paul Gates. Harper & Row. 440 pp. $12.95.*

DESMOND SMITH

Air Time is so full of "inside information" and malicious gossip that anyone interested in the flip side of *CBS News* ought to read this book. But as a colleague of mine at CBS observes, "The trouble is that six years from now it will probably be required reading at Syracuse University as the authentic history of *CBS News* during the 1960s. Everyone then will say: 'That's the way it was.' "

Well was it? The answer is mixed: yes and no. As one who worked at *CBS News* during the 1960s and early 1970s and was present on some of the occasions included in the book I would give a qualified "yes" to Gates's description of the way it was, a decided "no" to *why* it was. The author has virtually no interest in either the process or the product of news-gathering at CBS. One looks in vain for any discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of CBS's domestic coverage during a period that included such major stories as the civil rights movement, the anti-war movement, the radicalization of the American campus, urban riots, the assassinations of both Kennedys, Martin Luther King, and the attempt on the life of Gov. George Wallace. Similarly, there is (except for a brief mention of Vietnam) neither analysis nor discussion of CBS's foreign coverage and how it was orchestrated, no discussion of the tremendous impact satellite technology (with its ability to feed a "same day" story from anywhere in the world) was to have on TV news in the 1960s, nor is much space given to how *CBS News* is organized (no mention at all of such workhorse domestic bureaus as Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles). If CBS was, arguably, the best television news organization in the world by the early 1970s, how did this come about? Mr. Gates provides few clues. And while there are entire chapters on the more colorful reporters and producers, the author gives scant attention to the crucial role of Richard Salant as president of the news division. It was this modest and gifted individual who—in the opinion of most CBS newsmen—protected *CBS News* from undue corporate pressures (particularly in the Nixon years) and who through both persuasion and fiat parlayed the Murrow inheritance into one of America's great private institutions of public information. It is quite an extraordinary omission: rather as if Mr. Gates had written a history of the New Deal without mentioning Roosevelt.

Yet *Air Time* is good value for money. Gates, an ex-CBS news writer, knows from on-the-job experience the daily routine whereby broadcasts are assembled; the princely figures who decide whose news story will make the lineup and whose will be "passed," the minor court officials who have their role to play, down to the not-so-humble reporters who toil in the castle garden. A great deal of Gates's book is taken up with the power struggle which goes on in television news organizations, as it does in soap companies, brokerage houses and everywhere else.

In the manner of a television miniseries (though, alas, without sex) we are introduced to the principal characters. Gruff old Ernie Leiser, executive producer of the evening news; his successor Les Midgley who, "aloof and taciturn, moved through the bustling world of *CBS News* with such lofty reserve that he seemed, most of the time, to be oblivious of all the surrounding commotion." Midgley in turn yields to the terrible-tongued Paul Greenberg, who, in turn, will be fired by the "blunt and austere" Bill Small, the newly appointed senior vice president for hard news. Gates recounts with relish (source: Greenberg ?) one of their many disputes, during which Greenberg reportedly told Small: "You couldn't find a news story if it was stuck up your ass and somebody shoved your fat head up there to look for it." Shortly thereafter Greenberg departs for *NBC News*. There is good old Charlie Kuralt, crotchety Hughes Rudd (whom one faction at CBS wanted to send after Kuralt as a kind of one-man "truth squad" to rip the silver lining out of Charlie's "just folks" *On the Road* episodes). We meet the "Duke" of Collingwood, the "gray eminence" Eric Sevareid, feisty Dan Rather, "tense and demanding" Roger Mudd, *Wunderkind* Don Hewitt (creator of *60 Minutes*) who "liked to think of himself as an electronic equivalent of Hildy Johnson" and of course old "Ironpants" himself, Walter Cronkite, who now, in the twilight of a brilliant career, remains the wary old lion ceaselessly padding around the water hole, keeping at bay younger whippersnappers who covet the territory.

Among the rest of the thronging characters, easily the most fascinating is Gordon Manning, for years the senior vice president for hard news. Manning certainly has a place in the rich mythology of CBS. His name invariably crops up whenever *CBS News* people get together. Short, dapper, hyperactive, Manning was, in my time at CBS, the terrier rather than the terror of the news organization. A former executive editor of *Newsweek*, Manning was a prodigious ripper and tearer of newspapers, and magazines, which—attached to a short note, or simply scrawled on—would be dispatched by the bushel-load to various producers inside CBS. These memos (known as "Gordograms") are collectors' items these days. I myself possess a prized collection of notes from him, all of which end with a question mark.

During the Nixon years, Manning's preoccupation was Bebe Rebozo, the President's Florida errand boy. Manning was sure Rebozo was up to no good and felt it was only a matter of time before "Biscuits" (as *NBC News* was known) would scoop us. The least mention of Rebozo on the wires or in the press would result in a flurry of increasingly urgent "Gordograms." In the early months the tone was invariably moderate: "Assume we keeping posted on Rebozo?? *Chicago Sun-Times* yesterday had major piece on the story. G.M."

But later they became more querulous: "I don't mean to be unfair; but I think we all agreed Bebe was a story many weeks ago. Somehow our efforts seemed diffuse, undirected, spotty. And worse, we got nothing on the air. Is this a story we cannot really do on the broadcast side? given our resources and organizational set-up? G. Manning."

As events transpired, not even the redoubtable Woodward and Bernstein could lay a finger on the elusive Bebe, but by then *The Washington Post* had a

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much better story—one that CBS (and the other TV networks) missed completely, Watergate.

Looking backward, it is easy to see now that while *CBS News* excelled at big set-piece journalism of the 60s and 70s—space, the political conventions, the Kennedy assassinations, the civil rights march on Washington—the news organization floundered when it came to enterprise or investigative reporting. The Pentagon papers, My Lai, the Tonkin Gulf fakery, Michigan State University's CIA connection, auto safety, the perils of DDT, and Watergate itself were all stories that we who worked at CBS in those years were frustrated to find had shown up first in such magazines and newspapers as *The Nation, Ramparts, The New Yorker, I.F. Stone's Weekly, The New York Times* or *The Washington Post.*

I looked eagerly for what Gates had to say about this. All I found was a reference to Roger Mudd's sharp attack (delivered on the campus of his alma mater, Washington and Lee) on the media's shortcomings. Mudd, who along with Hughes Rudd, has long been considered the brightest of CBS newsmen, noted that: "The inherent limitations of our media make it a powerful means of communication, but also a crude one which tends to strike at the emotions rather than the intellect." Mudd went on to deplore "the dangerous and increasing concentration on action which is usually violent and bloody rather than on thought; on happenings rather than issues; on shock rather than explanation; on personalization rather than ideas." Delivered as it was at the height of the Nixon-Agnew media war, it was considered at the time to be a stab in the back by one of our own inside CBS. Today, in the mid-70s, anyone who thinks for more than half a minute about TV news will see that Mudd was correct in his analysis.

For all the talk about "responsibility in media" it remains as true today as in the 60s that any lunatic with a gun who has the wit to go berserk before 4 P.M. in a major American city has an almost foolproof opportunity to command air time on network TV news; four frantic women who are prepared to daub themselves in blood and chicken feathers and tie themselves to the White House gates will edge out a spokesperson for ERA every time; the charred remains and wreckage of a commercial airline crash that kills 180 people will be worth three minutes, but the inquiry, eighteen months later, which pins the crash to a faulty cargo door, something the manufacturer knew about, ends up as a fifteen-second on-camera "tell" story; almost any avid TV news watcher can tell you about President Carter's work habits, few can explain his energy policy. Mudd's remarks should be framed in every TV news executive's office, especially so at *CBS News* which tends to believe, like *The New York Times* that "When the *Daily News* prints it, it is sex; when *we* print it, it is sociology."

Gary Paul Gates has written an exuberant book on *who* makes the news inside CBS. *How* the news is made inside CBS is a book yet to be written. □

The Scourge of Central Europe

A TOMB FOR BORIS DAVIDOVICH. *By Danilo Kis. Translated by Duska Micki-Mitchell. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 135 pp. $6.95.*

GARDEN, ASHES. *By Danilo Kis. Translated by William J. Hannaher. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 170 pp. $2.95.*

ERNST PAWEL

In Yugoslavia, where literary polemics often escalate into uncivil war, Danilo Kis (pronounced Kish) has at 43 already acquired the formidable reputation of a combat veteran equally lethal with pen, mouth and fist. These are dangerous talents, but Kis as a writer of uncommon sensitivity and extraordinary gifts cannot help but live dangerously.

He claims literary descent from Borges, and one must take him at his word. But on the evidence, his kinship with the oracular Argentine seems tenuous at best. Kis is a quintessential product of Central Europe—not, to be sure, the heartland of kitsch, cafés, and castles on the Danube but of a Europe with black night for a center, a witches' cauldron whose poison finally boiled over, leaving scorched earth and a few burned children by way of survivors.

Kis is one of these, and not afraid of the fire. Child of a "mixed" marriage —between a Hungarian Jew and a Greek-Orthodox mother from Montenegro, he was born in Yugoslavia in 1935 and grew up precociously and precipitately in a world with no room for mixed marriages, let alone childhood. The war shaped his vision which is not so much linked with the mythology of Borges as with the grim compassion of Isaac Babel.

Both Kis and Babel are socialist realists in the Old Testament tradition. But Babel died in a Soviet slave labor camp just about the time Kis was born, and what separates them is a generation gap wide enough to have swallowed not only Babel himself but also faith, hope and pieties.

A Tomb for Boris Davidovich is hagiography without the pieties, compiled by an agnostic. The view of communism as a religion is scarcely original, but few have been able to project it with the dispassionate yet intimate knowledge that Kis brings to the subject. The god that failed his fathers never had a chance to fail or even fool him. He was raised in the icy shadow of its church, far enough to see it in perspective, yet close enough to feel the dank chill that emanates from the interior.

And so, fabulist to the core, he invents the lives of seven martyred apostles whose blood, guts, brains and dreams are immured in this glorified prison. Truth is stranger than fiction and merely befuddles the issues, whereas his fictitious revolutionaries, whose interlocking destinies he so meticulously documents in these pseudo-biographical sketches, embody the unholy alliance between dream and nightmare that turns men into commissars.

It would be altogether wrong, however, to read this book as yet another anti-Communist manifesto. Kis wastes no emotions denouncing the obvious—that the means have become an end in themselves, that cannibals eat their children. He knows intuitively, as a child of his time with eyes to see, that faith always and forever invents an end to justify the means, just as he knows that the end is always a flag, a cross, a graven image sanctifying murder.

But the knowledge does not immunize him against the rage and tenderness that link the generations in spite of themselves, no matter how wide the gulf between them; these self-destructing apostles are the ancestors of their creator. It is his ambivalence toward them that breathes life into his characters even though they lack humanity. For while sanctimonious orthodoxy holds that revolutionaries cannot afford to be human, Kis knows better—not being quite human is what made them revolutionaries in the first place. Experience

Ernst Pawel is a novelist—From the Dark Tower, In the Absence of Magic (*both Macmillan*)—*who frequently reports on literary and political developments abroad.*

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

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would seem to bear him out; the world is full of wild men and women waiting for their chance to make the Auschwitz trains run on time.

Yet at the same time, his heroes are tragic figures whose strength is their weakness—Jews every one of them, for one thing, trapped in ghettos that owe nothing to nostalgia. Activist Jews, moreover, not content to fiddle on the roof while waiting for the Messiah, but determined instead to speed his arrival by liquidating his enemies. Six are left-wing revolutionaries caught in the winds of change and dying in the belief that they had something to do with sowing the hurricane. One is an expert butcher radicalized by a rabbi's curse; unable to find more suitable employment, he turns his skills to progressive purpose and carves up a traitor who turns out not to have been one. It scarcely matters; the just and the unjust, the unconditional believers and the secret doubters all meet their fate in the cellars of some Lubyanka or the wastes of the Gulag Archipelago.

Only one story reaches into the far-distant past to underscore the parallels between the victims of Stalin's purges and of the Inquisition. The irony is effective here as throughout the book; but the analogies between Baruch David Neumann, tortured to death at Carcassone in 1337, and his putative descendant Boris Davidovich Novsky, who exactly six centuries later eluded his later-day Soviet inquisitors by leaping into a vat of molten steel seems forced, an étude in the key of Borges, full of dissonant archness. Gestures of piety had best be avoided by those who don't believe in god.

Kis doesn't believe, and his book is, among other things, a savagely blasphemous attack on Him Who Was God to a generation of Communists. While Stalin's corpse is no longer on display under the bell jar, his spirit resists burial: it has simply merged with the mainstream of totalitarian mentality that clogs the sewers of the mind. *A Tomb for Boris Davidovich* was bound to infuriate all the would-be commissars who infest Yugoslav culture and politics, still yearning for *Der Tag* when literary disputes could once again be settled not by censorship but by torture. (This is not to endorse censorship; but burning books seems significantly less final than burning their authors, and one should not minimize the difference.) Since the book won wide acclaim and was being considered for a literary prize, the stalinoids mounted a major attack on it that made up in stridency for what it lacked in coherence.

The initial charge of plagiarism was easily refuted. In any event, it merely served as a smokescreen for a much more serious and traditional charge: Kis was a Jew.

Stalin lives, and so does Hitler, bedfellows once again, spawning vipers.

To the extent of having had a Jewish father, Kis is obviously guilty as charged, and proud of it, even though his self-defined Jewishness would scarcely meet rabbinical standards. Its major characteristic seems to be a certain tribal pugnacity reinforced by the Montenegran heritage from his mother's side. At any rate, in response to the orchestrated campaign against him as a rootless cosmopolitan, an un-Yugoslav pamphleteer in the service of world Jewry, he recently published a 344-page polemical counterblast entitled *The Anatomy Lesson* (Nolit, Belgrade, 1978) designed to settle with his enemies while at the same time spelling out his own position.

"Nationalism is, above all, paranoia," he writes, taking aim at the racists of whatever label. "In its collective form, it derives from fear, envy, and above all from a deficient sense of selfhood. Collective paranoia is the sum total of individual delusions carried to paroxysmal extremity."

The Anatomy Lesson is not likely to be translated. To most Americans, myself included, the book for all its brilliant, vituperative ferocity would seem largely unreadable, even if one sympathizes with the author's point of view. A vast amount of energy is wasted on targets that scarcely warrant more than the lucid first chapter with its defiant affirmation of universal human values, and its ringing denunciation of chauvinism and anti-Semitism. Inside Yugoslavia, however, the book has apparently been quite successful, a fact that undoubtedly reflects both the lethal potential of literary combat in confined spaces, and the increasing danger of subsurface tensions threatening to erupt in that precariously multinational country, especially if Tito should turn out to be mortal after all.

It is therefore particularly gratifying that Kis's American publishers have decided to bring out a paperback edition of the author's first book, the superb *Garden, Ashes* originally published in 1975. It is a singularly moving evocation of being a child without childhood, and of a family trying to survive the end of the world. It is also a grown son's tribute to a father outrageous, preposterous and absurd who, in death, grew larger than life and whom he loved with a passion

ANIMAL CRACKERS

On the runway they pattern up harmless
as hinged cigars. But strapped inside
you count the scarred rivets, burn marks
over the fuselage, beads of condensation
jigging between the portholes
and their safety-walls.

The day this armadillo left its factory,
rolled from its tin cathedral empty and immense,
nobody talked about perfection. They'd
soldered her plates on with hairline torches,
but like me mostly thought of duck-blinds, or
light in a Woodstock window, missing a seam.

So we all fly. If only each landing
were the same! These screws of fear are
limned on the smallest differences, they
rattle badly a foot above the tarmac. Our
three hundred errors all drop down together,
coming home prey to the welder's daydream.

Like the shell of a dragonfly cast by
a heavy sportsman, we land whimsically,
a little askew, not subject to the line.
Now the piped cantata only sickens.
And the steward in his Mae West, who did
his best five-and-dime demo showing
how to clean up on bad odds.

Kathy Callaway

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that did not declare itself until too late.

The autobiographical facts behind the novel are transparent. At the outbreak of World War II, Kis and his family fled from Yugoslavia to Hungary and went underground, trying in various disguises to elude the Nazis and their native henchmen. The mother and her two children survived; the father ultimately disappeared, presumably incinerated in one of the death camps. Marked by this childhood in exile, a stranger among strangers—another point cited against him by his accusers—Kis has more than earned his convictions, a first-hand witness to the murderous potential of xenophobia generally, and anti-Semitism in particular.

But far transcending the facts, however dramatic, is his manner of dealing with them. The potent blend of lyrical poignancy and sardonic irreverence transforms childhood and exile into an original vision of exceptional force and beauty.

It is good to have first-rate translations of these two books by a writer who not only has the gifts of a poet but also the courage to use them in the fight against those who, having won the last war, never stopped conspiring to start the next one. □

Oh Dad, Poor Dad

MOTHER'S DAY. *By Robert Miner. Richard Marek Books. 250 pp. $8.95.*

ANTHONY ASTRACHAN

Matthew Vole has discovered some truths. Being a mother can drive you mad. Mothers not only love their children with fine and beautiful passions, they may also hate them—at the same moments, or in alternate moments—with broad and ugly passions.

Matthew Vole is not the first to utter these unspeakable truths, of course. Women have been muttering, or screaming, them for years. But most men and many women are blind to the mother-madness and mother-hate in women for whom motherhood is considered the normal state. The madness and the hate are even more tenacious in the still-abnormal state of a man's doing the mothering, as Matthew does in Robert Miner's fascinating and exasperating first novel.

Matthew marries Cindy because she is pregnant. They disagree on child raising; Matt, a child of the 1960s, tells Cindy and her mother that "discipline is fascism, dipped in bronze for mothers." The Voles have a second baby because playing house is one of the ways you try to cure a failing marriage. Cindy leaves him and the children in rural Connecticut to liberate herself in a New York advertising agency: "You wanted them and now you got them." Matthew learns, the hard way, all the truths masked by "that conspiracy of silence called motherhood that women have visited forever upon each new generation of mothers. Only this mother happened to be a man. And this mother keeps no secrets."

Matt learns, and tells, what it feels like to have tides batter endlessly, tirelessly, on his head, belly, groin and skin. There are the tides of work (as bank teller, magazine editor, cable winder) and day-care, rent and food, diaper-changing and sickness, his children's uncanny ability to interrupt his infrequent sex life at the point of orgasm. The accumulation is more than most real-life mothers or single fathers have to bear; the kids are more obnoxious, Matt more violent, the house more slovenly than the norms we fix in our heads to preserve our own sanity. Matt is crazier than we are.

So he does things we don't want to accept. He fantasizes teen-agers castrating his 2½-year-old son, Thomas, when his burdens force him to let the boy go into a public toilet by himself. He fantasizes both children's deaths. He really does abuse them once or twice. He comes close to drowning Thomas.

These painful passages have reminded other reviewers of writers as diverse as Doris Lessing, Joyce Carol Oates, John Updike and Hubert Selby. The comparisons are not always favorable to Miner. I keep coming back to *The Mother Knot*, Jane Lazarre's remarkable book of nonfiction in which she explores her own experience of motherhood and illuminates the dark areas. The styles are different, but the feelings are similar. Lazarre quotes one of her friends: "Being a mother is a terrible thing. It ruins your relationship with your husband. It ruins your life. You can't leave them because you love them and when you're with them you hate them. . . . I feel as if I am on the verge of cracking up." In the same conversation, Lazarre says she would die for her son: " 'I would much prefer to die than lose him. I guess that's love'—I winced and we both laughed—'but he has destroyed my life and I live only to find a way of getting it back again.' "

Despite this mother-hate, Lazarre leaves you feeling that she is sane. Miner leaves you feeling that Matthew Vole is crazy for most of the novel. But I keep accepting Matt's unacceptable "secrets," not despite but because of my exasperation at his inability to use some common sense. It makes him real. So does his obsession with food and shit and clothes, an obsession he shares with real-life mothers and single fathers much less crazy than Matt. So does his inability to see that his distortion of classical Freudian patterns reveals something about the way his own parents raised him.

Reality also grows out of the humor with which Miner makes Matt tell about his calamities, which are in fact small; the large calamities don't happen. But Miner works the cataclysm of getting on a New York bus with two infants and a suitcase for a rich vein of laughter. He finds other lodes of humor in the widely divergent biorhythms of editors and factory foremen who don't mother and subordinates who do, in the transformation of once monomaniac sperm into kamikaze tadpoles under the stresses of modern living, in a nightmare child-care center. The humor is sometimes black, sometimes blood-red, but always funny.

And reality grows out of Matthew's moments of grace. Some are simply times when his love for his children overcomes the tides of anger. Some are stages of his growth to adulthood, like his survival of a bout with a mother substitute who comes into his bed as part of the baby-care contract and then challenges him to "be a man" by beating her.

Some moments of grace are part of the effect that Matthew's role reversal has on his sexuality. He finds himself having "lesbian alliances with some women. This is no androgyne surrender, understand, no shift to the platonic. More a kind of license, an abandon. A thaw . . . In the way men often find themselves attracted to the tomboy, . . . certain child-bearing women are attracted to me, a mother."

The change is not only lesbian, it is incestuous, as when Matthew winds up in bed with Joanne, his best friend's girl, while the three adults and Matt's two children are sharing a New York apartment: "For Joanne, I began to dis-

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Anthony Astrachan, a senior editor of Geo *magazine, is writing a book on how men feel about the changes that women are making.*

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cover, such sisterly intimacy with a man urged her into sexual explorations she might never have tried—confident, I guess, that I wouldn't use her as a man might. For me, Joanne's increasing physical abandonment led me deeper into emotional intimacies I'd never known with anyone, man or woman. Both of us arose from such encounters giddy with possibility but confused and scared at our new vulnerability."

This seems to me to say more about some of the ways we modify gender in the psychological society than mountains of pseudoscience or ideology.

Mother's Day has a full share of faults. The writing is clumsy as often as it is brilliant. None of the characters comes to life except Matthew. I'm not sure whether the ending, in which Matt lets Cindy and her new husband take the children, is adult recognition of the need for two parents or a cop-out. But the novel always conveys its emotions directly, without disguise, falsification or insulation. It's powerful. □

10,000 Successive Octobers

THE SNOW LEOPARD. *Peter Matthiessen. The Viking Press. 338 pp. $10.*

JIM HARRISON

It is a curious thing to advertise for an audience for so private and idiosyncratic a journey. Not that *The Snow Leopard* was written in scorn of an audience, but one feels sure it is the same book Matthiessen would have written had its later publishing been impossible. *The Snow Leopard* is an heraldic book, full of ghosts, demons and unfamiliar mythologies; a well-veiled, lower-case buddhist text set in the virtual top of the world, the Himalayas. It is a book totally devoid of comforting banalities—no kitchens, lingerie, politics, newspapers or clocks other than the timeless clock of the seasons (it's not very helpful to ascribe dates to 10,000 successive Octobers). Like all good books it is about death, and the imminence of death is fresh and lively, if you will, because we are drawn hypnotically along into a landscape where neither the beasts nor men are familiar.

On the surface the book is structured as the diary of a trek into the Tibetan Plateau of Nepal. In the autumn of 1973 Peter Matthiessen accompanied the zoologist George Schaller (author of the esteemed *Mountain Gorilla* and *The Serengetti Lion*) on a journey to the Crystal Mountain, "walking west under Annapurna and north along the Kali Gandaki River, then west and north again, around the Dhaulagiri peaks and across the Kanjiroba, two hundred and fifty miles or more to the Land of Dolpo, on the Tibetan Plateau." At Crystal Mountain Schaller and Matthiessen hoped to study the bharal, the Himalayan wild blue sheep, protected there from slaughter by the grace of the local Lama. The main complication (an understatement) of the trip was that Schaller needed to study the sheep in their November rutting season when they were most active and accessible, so the hike of more than thirty days accompanied by a half dozen Sherpas and bearers was made over steep passes at the onset of the mountain winter.

On this level the whole trip appears utterly foolhardy. An appendicitis attack or even a minor stumble would very likely be fatal. These may not be major considerations for a scientist like Schaller but Matthiessen voices them at the same time that he expresses his desire to see a snow leopard, a nearly mythological beast, the least accessible of the great cats, perhaps the least accessible mammal on earth. In fact the book could be easily read on the level of a natural history thriller and that is the way *The New Yorker* excerpted the text—rather understandably in lieu of the difficulty at its core. And *The Snow Leopard* succeeds admirably as a fabled 19th-century action-adventure yarn: vast gorges, impassable rivers, wolves racing across glaciers, crazed village mastiffs, precipitous cliffs with half-foot-wide trails, the hint of the yeti, or Abominable Snowman; blizzards, snow blindness, thievery, harrowing cold and exhaustion. But then that is only partially what the book is about, and the reviewer, like some minor league John Huston, wonders how to suggest that this beloved Moby Dick is so very much more than a whaling romance.

Peter Matthiessen must be our most eccentric major writer; his eccentricities are those of thought, not language. His style is not exotic and owns a studied Brahmin grace and wit, though the wit is rather more discomfiting than funny. He writes cleanly and beautifully. But he is the odd creature whose thought makes us see how despite the obvious and perhaps overdiscussed talents of Bellow, Mailer, Updike, Pynchon et al., they are the philosophically expectable products of university-based thought in the 1940s and 1950s. This is much less a denigration than an observation about lack of variety.

Matthiessen is a Zen Buddhist, in a manner more consequential to his work than Bellow's Jewishness, or the neo-Barthian (Karl, not John) protestantism of Updike, the frazzled *existenz* of Mailer. This morning in a small tourist cabin in Montana looking out over the cordillera of the Absarokas with only *The Snow Leopard* at hand I recalled my favorite Matthiessen books: *Wildlife in America, The Cloud Forest, The Wind Birds, The Tree Where Man Was Born*, and the novels, *At Play in the Fields of the Lord*, and *Far Tortuga*. Oddly, "Zen" is not mentioned in any of these although it certainly could be sensed by anyone familiar with it. But it is unobtrusive, and the writing characterized by Olympian austerity as it is, avoids the personal. Reading these books you are left with the notion of how deeply and to what extent Matthiessen's work surpasses the genre he is identified with, but the man himself remains a puzzle until *The Snow Leopard*.

Running concurrent to the outward journey in *The Snow Leopard* is an equally torturous inward journey, and the two are balanced to the extent that neither overwhelms the other. Matthiessen for the first time becomes utterly candid about his life without being "confessional." He describes early experiments with hallucinogens (mostly lysergic acid) which were attempts to reach the visionary by a shortcut; his apprenticeship in Zen under Eido Roshi and Maezumi Roshi; and most poignantly, the death from cancer of his wife Deborah some six months before the trip.

There is something in the ineffable nature of Zen that challenges men to try to write about it. It is most commonly misunderstood as another glyph for survival available to modern man, a device of comprehension. Beyond the level of flirtation it is not particularly popular because it is so totally nonsupportive. There is nowhere to turn in the unfolding of one's true nature except to the Roshi who only redirects

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the pain of discovery. To the student, Zen is the ocean and he is the fish; properly understood, it is consciousness itself, unmediated by opinions, hope, or gods, with few and naked precepts. In *The Snow Leopard* Matthiessen makes the best run I've ever read at explicating Buddhist and Tantric terminology and hagiography. He has a curious talent for clarifying and dismissing the aura of the secretive and arcane. The burden of the Zen man is ultimately *claritas*, and the occultist urge for mystery is only another excuse for the unlived life. In Zen you give a cup of tea to your demons and disarm them, whether they own interior schizoid colors, or the very real apparel of an Himalyan gorge. The life to be lived is in the unintervened moment, where rock, bird, man and beast may be perceived as they are, in league with the universe, captives of time.

Beyond my own clumsy and tentatively stated framework Matthiessen has written a magnificent book: a kind of lunar paradigm and map of the sacred for any man's journey, where the snow leopard itself sits grail-like at the edge of consciousness, an infinitely stubborn koan in beast's clothing. Toward the end of the book when Matthiessen's Sherpa guide and mentor, Tutken, disappears we return again to the vertigo of the modern. But there is a sense, however slight and fleeting, that the book has transcended the usual limits of language and has given us a glimpse of a world that is not less "there" for the fact that we will never see it. □

DEPAYSE

In the mountains
Above Chambéry
I found a place
A kind of overlook
With a stone cross
And went there often
With my son.

The air was gray, tired.
The car metal
Ticked as it cooled.
We sat in the lee of a high wall
Away from the wind
But in the full empty sound of it.

The road went back down
Unspooled like . . .
A dirty bandage.
But nothing
Not one thing had the right name.

On the wall
The cement covering had cracked
In places fallen
And left exposed
The skulls of smooth white stones
("Une vingtaine")
I counted for something to do.

Now and then
I'd mold a smile for my son.
He sat and hummed
And turned his plastic truck
Through amber sand
Washed from higher slopes.

The village
Would stay below, far below
Wordless, sullen
And keep to itself.

Peter Makuck

The Redbaiting Brigades

POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA: From 1879 to the Present. *By Robert Justin Goldstein. Two Continents. 682 pp. Paper $6.95.*

WILLIAM PRESTON

It is now a popular assumption that political terrorism is on the rise. This thoroughly unhistorical, even hyprocritical notion obscures the violent repressive past and confirms the myth of consensus. Americans, appalled by recent atrocities here and abroad, ignore the terrorism that was directed against their dissenting forebears. Italy today has no match for the vicious and deadly intimidation which victimized black life in the South or for the willingness to kill that existed in corporate feudalisms like Harlan County, Kentucky. In the 1937 Memorial Day Massacre at Republic Steel, for example, ten demonstrating strikers were killed, six of them shot in the back.

Long before Vietnam, in fact, governments and their police agents had created free-fire zones for groups that challenged the "existing power relationships." Radicals have always been the "gooks" in the historical body count, their deaths and disasters never generating the public significance that elite victims attain as a matter of course. Historians have been partly to blame. They have generally ignored or demeaned those on the bottom, suppressed sympathetic accounts of radicalism and, all in all, served as agents for official points of view. The valid work that has been done on radicals and repression has remained in fragments, waiting for someone to piece together a comprehensive analysis from this fugitive material. Robert J. Goldstein has now performed this job. His *Political Repression in Modern America* is an important contribution—an immense, informative and skillful interpretation of a vast, relatively unknown terrain. If it is not the complete chronicle, it is still the essential beginning.

Goldstein defines his mission at the start: "Political repression consists of government action which grossly discriminates against persons or organizations viewed as presenting a fundamental challenge to existing power relationships or key governmental policies, because of their perceived political beliefs." Contrary to the theory that popular majorities in a democracy are responsible for suppressing dissent, Goldstein insists that repression is primarily the work of elites dominating the policy-making branches of government. This was especially true, of course, in the years before the New Deal when corporate power represented a state within a state. Official and pseudo-official violence, illegal intimidation, and killing without fear of retribution (it was the surviving victims that were usually indicted) were the major expressions of corporate dominance nationally.

What had been accomplished by the time of FDR's inauguration? The score was impressive: the destruction of four union movements and of all radical tendencies within organized labor; the isolation and disruption of two major radical political parties; and a pervasive "self-censorship" imposed by Americans on their own political options, most notably in their refusal to consider any alternatives to the current consensus.

Goldstein covers the last thirty years in lurid detail, carrying the story through the Nixon climax in order to assess the continuities and the innovations in modern political repression. What emerges most clearly is the alarming increase in covert activity as opposed to the mainly overt suppression of the earlier decades. Physical assaults, police beatings, lynch-

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ings and murders waned as constitutional protections developed and progress toward civil liberties occurred, but repressive action shifted to darker and subtler modes.

The technology of surveillance facilitated this shift as did the bad name that overt brutality acquired. But something else very American was also at work. The country always wanted social control as cheaply as it could get it. Vigilante justice had long been the low-cost substitute for expensive professionals. The modern equivalent is internal disruption. Informers, *agents-provocateurs*, and advanced systems of surveillance now provide maximum repression for a minimum investment. Justified as mere intelligence fact finders, these internal security agents have waged a secret guerrilla war against organizations on the government's hit list. National Security Agency mail and communications intercepts, the FBI's Cointelpro operation, CIA "Operation Chaos," and Army intelligence spying were all examples of this new tactic. Undercover intimidation, disruption and harassment can inhibit and destroy opponents without ever having to be tested by legal restraints. The vigilantes are now working for the government.

But other more traditional devices continued to be of service, proving also that repressive techniques once tried almost never fade away. Legislative investigations attacked wrong thinking and suspect associations. A vast "dossier dictatorship" came into being: by 1960 the FBI alone had 430,000 files on subversive individuals and organizations. These years also witnessed the Attorney General's list ("the most arbitrary and far reaching power [ever] given to a single public official"), passport control, deportations, Smith Act prosecutions, conspiracy trials, subversive detention centers for future emergencies, grand jury fishing expeditions, intimidation of the press, harassment of demonstrators and, under Nixon, special White House units of surveillance and disruption. Although state and local governments mimicked the federal initiative, repression, like so many other areas of American life, was now dominated by Washington and in that area increasingly by the executive branch.

By Carter's inauguration impressive results had again been achieved. Among the casualties were the Communist Party, the Socialist Workers Party, the Progressive Party, the Peace Movement, the New Left and the Black Panthers. Thousands of people had been fired (11,000), charged (20,000) and named as subversives. Science, scholarship, and their foundation support had been intimidated. For several decades, domestic reform had disappeared as a serious issue and foreign and military policies were tested by their anti-Communist purity alone.

Despite the smothering of dissent, protest won two important victories: the Vietnam disengagement and the exposure of executive malpractices stemming from Watergate. Yet these were ironic aftermaths of the very cold-war extremism that effectively denied foreign policy debate and screened administration security measures from public scrutiny.

As thorough and richly detailed as *Political Repression* really is, it is not as comprehensive as it might be. Under Goldstein's working criterion—presenting a fundamental challenge to existing power relationships—three other groups certainly qualify for inclusion: blacks, women and agrarian radicals. All of them faced "gross discrimination" by government and denial of First Amendment rights and due process, including the most basic political right of all, the vote. Populism, as Lawrence Goodwyn's recent *Democratic Promise* has shown, suffered the whole range of repressive measures from lynching to electoral fraud. It and the Non-Partisan League win mention by Goldstein but insufficient attention. On the other hand, except for the Black Panthers, the suppression of black people is virtually ignored, yet their history is filled with challenges to the existing power structure and with the savage official responses those elicited. And the women's movement has been the target of brutality, harassment, infiltration, disruption, jailings, censorship and grand jury intimidation.

A history of modern political repression should also include the other alternatives that governments have used to inhibit dissent. Sedition and political heresy have always attracted the attention of censorship forces on the lookout for dangerous ideas. But since World War I enforcement of the laws against drugs has served political purposes beyond the concern for public health. Nixon's "Agency of Fear" (as publicized by Edward Jay Epstein) was only the most recent example.

Repressive America is indeed a "Barnum and Bailey world" and most people, including historians, have trouble watching more than one ring at a time. Goldstein has certainly identified and documented the ominous growth of covert operations, while he has overlooked other tactics which have had an impressive longevity. Among those going way back, even before the modern era began, are conspiracy prosecutions, informers, *agents-provocateurs*, deportations (1978), legislative investigations and exposure, and grand jury abuses. On that account, Victor Lasky is on the mark; "it didn't start with Watergate."

Extremism in behalf of conformity has had a long and fruitful career. American paranoia and power have escalated the response to dissent. Governments, like the Pentagon, accumulate repressive weapons which are utilized in continuous pre-emptive strikes. It has always been possible to suppress some of the people all of the time and all of the people some of the time. Civil libertarians should recognize interludes between repressions as pauses

BLANCO

My sister comes, quietly,
Stepping where I step,
The street numb from the fog.
We are explorers.

In our yard
With a flashlight on
And eclipsed by the cold,
We know the sun is lost to this,
The woodpecker to its whittle,
The worm to the stitch
That closed our father's grave.

And ear pressed to the ground,
My sister speaks of
Ants nibbling the pods unstrung
From eucalyptus,
Roots cradling the skull's smile.

Hands curled into binoculars,
I focus on
What is suddenly a house wrapped
In incense. Inside,
Our father at a table
Listening to us move
As the earth moves.

I spit into my sister's palms,
Rubbing them brown with the dirt
Pinched from our lives.
I point over there,

And linking her small hands
Into a telescope,
She centers on the white
He could step from, his voice clear
And burning a hole
Where this sky is once more. . . .

Gary Soto

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that have refreshed governments for more aggressive advances in the future. Goldstein reminds us of the potential epitaph for American dissent which was spoken by that truly American President, Lyndon B. Johnson: "I believe in the right to dissent, but I do not believe it should be exercised." □

MUSIC

DAVID HAMILTON

Peter Maxwell Davies's first opera, *Taverner* (performed in 1972 at London's Covent Garden), was a musically absorbing, dramatically and philosophically elliptical essay in the distillation of myth from history. In a subsequent series of briefer, smaller-scale quasi-theatrical works (*Revelation and Fall, Eight Songs for a Mad King, Miss Donnithorne's Maggot*), Davies turned to the exploration of extreme mental states. Last year, he came back to opera —though not grand opera—and to quasi-historical legend: *The Martyrdom of Saint Magnus*, which received its first American performance on July 29 at the Aspen Music Festival, occupies a territory roughly bordered by medieval liturgical drama, Eliot's *Murder in the Cathedral*, and Benjamin Britten's church parables, as well as by Davies's own earlier music.

Magnus is the patron saint of Orkney, where Davies has a home and where he has founded a music festival, at which the opera was first performed, in the 12th-century cathedral of St. Magnus. The libretto is based on a novel by the Orcadian writer George Mackay Brown, its material considerably condensed and the attention focused exclusively on the religious problem of martyrdom; Davies has conflated a variety of crofters and poor people into a single figure, the crone Blind Mary, and discarded entirely the fabric of agricultural and seasonal rhythms that these characters express in the novel. The opera retains Brown's device of shifting the actual martyrdom—the murder of Magnus, for political reasons, by his rival Earl Hakon—to a 20th-century setting, after which the action returns to medieval times, as Blind Mary prays before the tomb of Magnus and her sight is restored.

The action is much stylized—for example, a sea battle between the Norsemen and Welsh is represented by two opposing heralds while Magnus stands in the ship singing a psalm. In its sparer way, the drama's course strikingly recalls Eliot's pioneering church drama: Blind Mary replaces the chorus of women; Magnus is confronted by four tempters; the scene in modern dress echoes Eliot's purposefully anachronistic Knights. At the point where he prepares to accept martyrdom, Magnus echoes Eliot's Becket: "Now my good angel, whom God has appointed to be my guardian, watch over me."

Yet the tone of the work is quite different—music can do that, of course. The vocal lines move in the even, hieratic rhythms of medieval chant, though their range is frequently wide and expressionistic. The instrumental ensemble is small: two winds, three brass, two strings, guitar, keyboards, and percussion; its dynamic ranges from hard-edged fortissimo depictions of battle to the solo guitar that accompanies Blind Mary's songs. The brief interludes between scenes are sure in color and mood. Some scenes are tightly structured, intense in counterpoint and rhythmic activity (the initial battle, the temptation), while others (Hakon's decision to murder Magnus, the final miracle) are more freely declaimed over ostinato figures in the orchestra. A particular tour de force, at least musically, is the voyage from the 12th to the 20th century, a sequence of brilliant stylistic variations on chant material leading from medieval motet to jazz (though the stage action here, spoken news bulletins and interviews about peace negotiations, runs a severe risk of drowning out the musical invention). In ways small and large, Davies continuously probes at the edges of his self-imposed archaism, and the result is a kaleidoscopic yet still unified score, at once personal and accessible.

The Aspen performance reached a high musical level, especially in the work of Jan DeGaetani as Blind Mary, her intensity and clarity of verbal projection wedded to richly varied timbres and an an unimpeachable musical authority. Paul Sperry sang Magnus with consistent beauty of tone and diction, though in spoken lines and physical action he was occasionally less specific. In a variety of roles, Richard Barrett, Robert Keefe and Thomas Paul were accurate and convincing. Richard Dufallo elicited fine playing from the ensemble, and maintained effective momentum.

As I have suggested, the production, directed by Ian Strasfogel, didn't follow all of the composer's original instructions. Given the circumstances, some of this was inevitable; the Aspen tent was never designed for opera, and could hardly be further in shape or ambiance from a medieval cathedral. Ann Sperry created an effective playing area, framed by striking repeated shapes that suggested Viking sails and the weaving imagery that permeates the libretto, and her costumes were simple but handsome. Some details of timing and pantomimed action didn't come off, and the gratuitous use of a voice-over narration during the interludes struck me as counterproductive, merely repeating information in the program and distracting attention from the music. Fortunately, the power of the work, and the concentration of the musical performance, carried over these difficulties.

Saint Magnus was but one event in Aspen's "Conference on Contemporary Music," which is woven through the central third of the nine-week summer season. Two composers were in residence this year, Michael Tippett (represented by five works, which I hope to consider in a subsequent column) and William Bolcom. Two of the Bolcom works played are already familiar from recordings: the eloquent Roethke cycle for tenor and chamber orchestra, *Open House* (brilliantly sung by Paul Sperry) and *Comoedia*, an 18th-century pastiche that is witty in both obvious and subtle ways (Nonesuch H 71324): I have no trouble with this music—breezy, confident, shot through with the language and gestures of the American popular idiom—but others seem to have difficulty finding the core of musical concern with which the apparently commonplace surface is knit together; one is required to put aside preconceptions about what is "proper." A set of six new songs with elegantly mordant texts by Arnold Weinstein was unveiled at Aspen by Bolcom and Joan Morris; you could argue whether these are "popular songs" or "art songs," but why bother? They are Songs, which nobody now writes better than Bolcom—and nobody sings better than Morris.

The ostensible theme of the "Conference" was "The Humanistic Spirit in Music"—a vague enough rubric to cover almost anything (it got still vaguer during an extremely muddled panel show at the Aspen Institute). Besides the Davies, Tippett and Bolcom pieces, it covered vocal works by Hans Pfitzner, Charles Jones, and a strikingly inventive quasi-cantata, *In the Garden*, by the young and obviously talented Edward Barnes. At the end of the three weeks came Schoenberg's monumental *Gurre-Lieder*, an effort that proved—at least in the rehearsal time available—too much for the Aspen forces. Still, I would not have missed Jan DeGaetani's vibrant singing of the Waldtaube or Werner Klemperer's affecting narration, and I hope someday to hear them and the other soloists (Viviane Thomas, Frederic di Marseille, Tonio di Paolo and Robert Keefe) in more orderly surroundings.

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Aside from the contemporary music, the strongest attraction of the Aspen Festival is variety: in at least four concerts a week (often more), the spectrum of repertory offered puts most other festivals to shame. The chamber music programs mix staples with real oddities. You may find an attractive novelty such as the Bliss Oboe Quintet (Philip West and the American String Quartet) rubbing shoulders with the Schubert Piano Trio in E-flat (Itzhak Perlman, Ronald Leonard, Emanuel Ax)—or, contrariwise, an exquisitely tedious trombone piece by Guy Ropartz hard on the heels of Beethoven's first Cello Sonata (powerful playing by Yo-Yo Ma ill-matched with Misha Dichter's mere fluency).

The orchestral concerts, too, avoid the beaten path, in performers as well as repertory. Claude Frank may not be an obvious interpreter of the Brahms D minor Piano Concerto, but his thoughtful playing brought its own special insights. Prokofiev's Third Symphony, Rachmaninoff's *Symphonic Dances*, Richard Strauss's *Metamorphosen*, Elgar's Violin Concerto (with Perlman the eloquent protagonist) do not turn up often on summer festivals—or, indeed, on regular season programs. If the performances are variable, they are also unpredictable—one of the most absorbing experiences of my three-week stay was the playing of the student orchestra, under Paul Vermel, in Berlioz's *Symphonie fantastique*, fresh and enthusiastic in a way that hardly any seasoned professional group can easily muster in such an overly familiar piece.

Finally, I was grateful for the opportunity to hear an uncommonly full version of Mozart's *Idomeneo*, conducted energetically and sympathetically by the festival's music director, Jorge Mester. Billed as a "concert version," this was in fact "semi-staged"—not a bad idea for the essentially static genre of *opera seria*, though somewhat vitiated in this case by an absurd ensemble of conflicting costumes. But director Richard Pearlman was not tempted into overly busy and distracting action; the music was allowed to cope with the characters' inner feelings, which it of course does superbly. Alexander Stevenson was an impressive Idomeneo, singing with force and fluency if not always smooth tone, and Judith James sang Electra's music more powerfully and accurately than I have ever heard it sung. (The original Munich score was used, with a soprano Idamante; Arbace's arias and the ballet music were omitted, but there were few other cuts.) This was a more satisfactory presentation of the opera than recent roles in New York and Washington. □

Crossword Puzzle No. 1740

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

1 See 27 across
4 The Sound of Music forbidden? (6)
11 Spirit with a magician is of small value, even in sale. (7)
12 No tiger is so wild, found in Malayo-Polynesian region. (7)
13 The state of the waltz? (9)
14 A film on this perhaps figures in a circular way to come back. (5)
15 By jingo, would you expect such a feeling to be shown! (13)
17 Does one have to be invited to speak? (5,8)
22 And now, what do the defeated have to say? (5)
24 Hitch, perhaps, and stitch temporarily. (It has its point.) (9)
25 Possibly a man might be the archbishop. (7)
26 Change the time of 19 for some flowers, and you'll have ample time. (7)
27, 7 down and 1 across Certainly not a rebel scribble to the sort of dude associated with the early air. (6,6,5)
28 Would such a moth urge you to take certain measures? (5)

DOWN

2 Old country song about people. (7)
3 Such people may need treatment when acid bites badly. (9)
5 Possibly guard the sugar mixture. (5)
6 Rain storm, with the foreign band in Africa. (7)
7 See 27 across
8 "Beast!" Is that what an accomplice to murder was called? (5)
9 Real characters these people. (Very close relationships about one.) (13)
10 Do they have ovoid capitals? (13)
16 Blum, in disguise, is engaged in a "get-even" maneuver, though making somewhat uncertain progress. (9)
18 Cut in on a different form of affected earnestness. (7)
19 On tape, one was notorious, but it takes years to be certain. (7)
20 Put out in a lithe manner? (6)
21 Heavens, one hits a high ball this way! (5)
23 If such is right-headed, tell how to make someone happy. (5)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1739

ACROSS: 1 Gates; 4 John Brown; 9 Town crier; 10 Robin; 11 Big Bertha; 12 Outre; 13 Condiments; 17 Malthusian; 21 Human; 22 Saturnine; 23 Trail; 24 Iguanodon; 25 Clearance; 26 Sewer. DOWN: 1 Gets by; 2 Towage; 3 Sacked; 4 Joint possession; 5 Hard and fast rule; 6 Barrooms; 7 Orbiting; 8 Nonsense; 14 Emphatic; 15 Clambake; 16 Shingler; 18 Brands; 19 Window; 20 Keener.

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